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COMMENTARY
EUCLID LIVES: THE SURVIVAL OF PROGRESSIVE
JURISPRUDENCE
Charles M. Haar* and Michael Allan Wolf*
The Supreme Court's expanded use of regulatory takings is making a highly controversial
and confusing concept more difficult to apply and defend. The Court and commentators
are invited to explore a different approach - Progressive jurisprudence, as represented
by the Court's enduring opinion in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. This
Commentary examines the reinvigoration of the Takings Clause and, in historical and
ideological terms, discusses the Progressiveness of Euclid and of the regulatory scheme
the Euclid Court approved. Professors Haar and Wolf identify and explore five inquiries
concerning the character of regulations affecting the use, ownership, and value of private
property. The answers to these questions remain relevant (and often outcome-
determinative) in cases involving allegedly confiscatory regulations. In the discussion of
each inquiry, the authors consider how the Court's current regulatory takings approach
suffers by comparison. The authors note that it is becoming increasingly difficult for the
current Justices to shape consistent majority opinions out of their diverse views
regarding the nature and applicability of regulatory takings. The authors urge American
jurists to take a second look at Euclid and the Euclidean inquiries as an alternative to
regulatory takings law and its unfortunate legacy of unnecessary confusion and judicial
overreaching.
I. INTRODUCTION: CONTINUING DOWN THE WRONG PATH
For seventy-five years, the United States Supreme Court has con-
sistently maintained the proposition that there is no fundamental con-
stitutional right to the speculative value of a piece of property. Offi-
cials representing even the most modest local government may
promulgate and enforce regulations that dramatically and demonstra-
bly reduce the value of real estate and personalty, so long as those
regulations promote the laudatory and adaptable goals of public
health, safety, morals, and general welfare.' This admittedly contro-
* Professor, Harvard Law School; Distinguished Visiting Professor, University of Miami
School of Law (haar@law.harvard.edu).
** Professor of Law and History, University of Richmond (mwolf@richmond.edu).
The authors thank Professor John Paul Jones for his insights, as well as Suzanne Cress, Scott
Crumley, and Beth Hungate-Noland, members all of the University of Richmond Law Review, for
their superb technical assistance.
I See Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 384, 395, 397 (1926) (upholding a
zoning scheme despite the landowner's allegation that regulation reduced the market value of its
property by at least seventy-five percent). For a confirmation of this essential aspect of Euclid,
see Concrete Pipe & Products., Inc. v. Construction. Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 645
('993), which declared that "our cases have long established that mere diminution in the value of
property, however serious, is insufficient to demonstrate a taking." For a recent state court opin-
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versial proposition has weathered profound political and ideological
shifts in the composition of the Court and in American legal thought
from the 1920S through the turn of a new century. Moreover, the Jus-
tices have imposed a significant burden on those private litigants who
seek vindication for the deprivation of their property "rights." This
burden involves the obligation to demonstrate that the targeted regula-
tion or its application is "clearly arbitrary and unreasonable."2
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.3 is the case most closely
identified with the denial of a constitutional right to speculative
value. 4 Many Court observers may be surprised to learn that this
strong endorsement of government regulatory activity occurred in the
mid-i92os, during the era of constitutional jurisprudence most closely
associated with laissez-faire and conservative judicial activism.
Merely three years earlier, Justice George Sutherland, the author of the
majority opinion in Euclid, had presented the Court's opinion in a
ion citing Euclid for this proposition, see Ventures Northwest L.P v. State, 914 P.2d i 18o (Wash.
Ct. App. I996). The Ventures Northwest court explained: "The mere denial of a permit for one
particular use does not establish the absence of any economically viable use; a regulation that may
impact the property's highest and best use is not a taking." Id. at 1188 (citing Euclid, 272 U.S. at
384).
2 Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395.
3 272 U.S. 365 (r926).
4 In Euclid, the The Ambler Realty Company challenged the Village of Euclid's zoning ordi-
nance, which classified lands in the Cleveland suburb by height, area, and use. While factories
and other industrial structures were permitted on part of Ambler's parcel, other portions were
restricted to residential and institutional uses. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 38o-82. When Federal District
Court Judge D.C. Westenhaver agreed with Ambler that the ordinance was unconstitutional in
Ambler Realty Co. v. Village of Euclid, 297 F. 307, 316 (N.D. Ohio 1924), Euclid appealed to the
Supreme Court, which, by a 6-3 vote, reversed. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 397. Ambler was represented
by Newton D. Baker, the former Cleveland mayor who served in the Wilson Administration as
Secretary of War and who helped found the firm known today as Baker & Hostetler. Baker was a
longtime friend and supporter of Westenhaver who, in 1917, had replaced John H. Clarke on the
district court bench after Clarke was elevated to the United States Supreme Court. When Justice
Clarke resigned, he was replaced by George Sutherland, who was to write the majority opinion in
Euclid. See William M. Randle, Professors, Reformers, Bureaucrats, and Cronies: The Players in
Euclid v. Ambler, in ZONING AND THE AMERICAN DREAM: PROMISES STILL To KEEP 3'
33-35 (Charles M. Haar & Jerold S. Kayden eds., i989) [hereinafter ZONING AND THE
AMERICAN DREAM]. Euclid's zealous counsel, James Metzenbaum, had helped draft the vil-
lage's ordinance and would later gain a national reputation as a zoning expert. See Michael Allan
Wolf, "Compelled by Conscientious Duty": Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. as Romance, 2
J. Sup. CT. HIsT. 1997, at 88, 9o; see also JAMES METZENBAUM, THE LAW OF ZONING (930).
For the historical background of the Euclid litigation and discussion of its continuing importance,
see the collection of essays in ZONING AND THE AMERICAN DREAM, supra. Professor Korn-
gold recently observed that the "milestone Supreme Court decision" in Euclid "has had a pro-
found effect on American life and jurisprudence. The decision provided the constitutional foun-
dation for an explosive growth in modern zoning, subdivision controls, and other governmental
land-use regulation that has transformed the organization and development of land and commu-
nities." Gerald Korngold, The Emergence of Private Land Use Controls in Large-Scale Subdivi-
sions: The Companion Story to Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 51 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
617, 617 (2001).
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case that invalidated a congressional minimum wage law for women
privately employed in the District of Columbia, because the statute
constituted a violation of the constitutional principle of "liberty of con-
tract."s  Indeed, Justice Sutherland was one of the legendary "Four
Horsemen" who often stood as bulwarks against government viola-
tions of property and contract rights. 6
We present the language and legacy of Euclid as an example of
Progressive jurisprudence. Imbued with the spirit of late nineteenth-
century pragmatism and grounded in early twentieth-century political
and ideological realities, Progressive jurisprudence is a novel and
characteristically American approach that views with great skepticism
bald assertions of abstract rights.
Recent schools of thought and ideological movements, such as criti-
cal legal studies, law and economics, and public choice, have captured
the imagination and attention of courts and commentators over the
past few decades.7 Unfortunately, we have lost sight of a strong ele-
ment of American legal thought that has long existed and that should
be rediscovered and modified for deployment in the current debate
over the nature and extent of private property rights. In the early
decades of the twentieth century, the Court began to develop an in-
cremental, experience- and fact-centered approach to evaluating the
legitimacy of comprehensive legislative attempts to regulate the use
and ownership of real property.8 An America whose intellectual con-
5 Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 553 (1923) (Sutherland, J.) ("[W]e cannot accept
the doctrine that women of mature age, suijuris, require or may be subjected to restrictions upon
their liberty of contract which could not lawfully be imposed in the case of men under similar cir-
cumstances.").
6 The other three members of this conservative bloc were Justices Pierce Butler, James
McReynolds, and Willis Van Devanter. See e.g., Robert Brauneis, "The Foundation of Our 'Regu-
latory Takings' Jurisprudence": The Myth and Meaning of Justice Holmes's Opinion in Pennsyl-
vania Coal Co. v. Mahon, iO6 YALE L.J. 613, 679 n.303 (z996) ("Intended to evoke the Four
Horsemen of the Apocalypse, the allusion was hardly complimentary."). Professor White has
questioned placing Sutherland among the other stalwarts. See G. Edward White, The Transfor-
mation of the Constitutional Regime of Foreign Relations, 85 VA. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (19g9). There are
indications of ideological vacillation by Sutherland and his colleagues in Professor Cushman's
clever "expose" of the Horsemen's hidden liberalism. See generally Barry Cushman, The Secret
Lives of the Four Horsemen, 83 VA. L. REV. 559, 56i (997) ("Theirs, then, is not a simple story of
handmaidens of the industrial and financial elite.").
7 For representative works in these areas, see CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES: ARTICLES,
NOTES, AND BOOK REVIEWS SELECTED FROM THE PAGES OF THE HARVARD LAW
REVIEW (1986); DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (5 th
ed. 1998); Critical Legal Studies Symposium, 36 STAN. L. REV. I (1984); Symposium on Law and
Economics, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 899 (1985); and Symposium on the Theory of Public Choice, 74
VA. L. REV. 167 (1988).
8 In surveying the Court's review of land-use regulation during the first two decades of the
twentieth century, Professor Hylton discovered a decidedly pro-regulation pattern:
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versation was dominated by the likes of William James, John Dewey,
and Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.,9 had little tolerance for the absolutist
belief embodied in Blackstone's notion of a property owner's exclusive
dominion.' 0 Rather, those Justices who were interested in deferential
oversight of their co-equal branches employed certain criteria to de-
termine which provisions would receive the judicial blessing, so that
the nation's regulatory experiment could continue.
The rough contours of Progressive jurisprudence have been the
subject of speculation by legal historians." This Commentary, invok-
ing as its primary focus the Court's opinion in Euclid, pulls together
several relatively unexplored strands of the Progressive legal tradition,
with an emphasis on a specific context - the use and ownership of
land.
Almost forgotten is the fact that during the preceding two decades the Supreme Court
heard numerous challenges to state and municipal land use regulations. In these cases,
which required the Court to define the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment's guar-
antee that one could not be deprived of property without due process of law, the suppos-
edly property-rights oriented Fuller and White Courts sided with the state in almost
every instance. Time after time, and with only one dissenting vote in two decades, the
Court found that the police power was sufficiently broad to warrant restrictions on the
use of land, even when they eliminated existing uses and imposed severe economic loss
on landowners. These cases provided a strong pro-regulation backdrop against which
the cases of the 1920S were decided.
Joseph Gordon Hylton, Prelude to Euclid." The United States Supreme Court and the Constitu-
tionality of Land Use Regulation, 19oo-9ao, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 1, 2 (2000).
9 For a stimulating exploration of the intellectual culture that spawned the pragmatism of
these three key figures (and of the enigmatic Charles Peirce), see LouIs MENAND, THE
METAPHYSICAL CLUB (2001).
10 See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 2 (photo.
reprint, Univ. of Chi. Press 1979) (1766):
There is nothing which so generally strikes the imagination, and engages the affections
of mankind, as the right of property; or that sole and despotic dominion which one man
claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right
of any other individual in the universe.
Professor Rose assures us that even the author of this oft-cited passage "was thoroughly
aware of... pervasive and serious qualifications on exclusive dominion." Carol M. Rose, Canons
of Property Talk, or, Blackstone's Anxiety, 108 YALE L.J. 6oi, 603 (1998).
11 Professor Grey places "The Progressives" between "The Classicists" and "The Legal Real-
ists." See Thomas C. Grey, Modern American Legal Thought, 1O6 YALE L.J. 493, 495-502 (1996)
(reviewing NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (1995)). Taking its
"philosophical inspiration from American pragmatism," Progressive jurisprudence rejected the
idea of law "as an abstract and autonomous system of norms." Id. at 497-98. To jurists such as
Holmes, Cardozo, and Pound, "[j]udicial resistance to democratic reforms was retrograde." Id. at
498.
For a discussion of Cardozo's articulation of "the working premises of Progressive jurispru-
dence," see MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-196o:
THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 190 (1992). See also Morton Horwitz, In What Sense Was
the Warren Court Progressive?, 4 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 95, 96 (1999) ("Progressives both before
and after the constitutional revolution of 1937 elevated democracy to constitutional fundamental-
ity.").
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Through the lens of Progressive jurisprudence, we present a fresh
critique of current efforts to push the Fifth Amendment's Takings
Clause 12 to and beyond its logical and sound public policy limitations.
In expanding the reach of the regulatory takings doctrine - that is,
the notion that statutes, ordinances, and regulations that do not in-
volve a physical invasion or appropriation can effect a violation of the
Takings Clause requiring just compensation, injunctive relief, or both
- the majority of the current Court (and the state and federal judges
inspired by their renewed activism) are not only straying from the
most relevant precedent, but also moving out of step with widely
shared values about public and private realms. 13 In the area of envi-
ronmental regulation especially (but certainly not solely), lawmakers
and judges are seeking guidance as they craft measures and engage in
analysis designed to reach a fruitful balance that respects private deci-
sionmaking regarding current use and consumption and that supports
public trustees acting on behalf of the future. Similarly, individuals
and entities in the private sector making investment, lending, sale, and
enhancement decisions regarding land and improvements on real
property need guidance and leadership from the Court, not a series of
decisions that only further muddles the line separating valid police
power regulation from illegal confiscation.
This Commentary will explore why Euclid survives, why it ought
to remain an important component of American law, and why it offers
powerful, yet unrecognized, guidance in the regulatory takings arena.
It will examine why the principles at the heart of this 1926 decision
have not, to employ a now-familiar metaphor, been "voted off the is-
12 U.S. CONST. amend. V ("nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation").
13 "Plethoric" best describes the legal literature on regulatory takings. Commentary roughly
falls into five categories. The "classics" explore the tension between public need and private right
that continues to remain influential even in the new century. See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Prop-
erty, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law,
8o HARV. L. REV. II65 (1967); Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36
(1964) [hereinafter Sax, Police Power]; Joseph L. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public
Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971). The "expansionists" envision a Takings Clause that would pre-
clude a wide range of police power regulation. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS:
PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985). The "reactions" are
typically found in symposia on the heels of the latest Court offering on the topic. One of the best
is Symposium, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1369 (1993) (featuring
articles by Professors Epstein, Fisher, Lazarus, and Sax). The "outside-the-boxes" are attempts to
reconceptualize the notion of a taking by regulation. See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE
L.J. 1077 (1993). Finally, there are "muddlers" that explain to the reader why this area of the law
remains hopelessly confused. The best is Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings
Issue Is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561 (1984). Our Commentary, drawing insights and
caveats from all five categories, redirects the discussion toward a competing constitutional vision
that is more solidly grounded in the American ethos - in generally understood notions of sound
legislative, administrative, and judicial lawmaking.
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land" by the enemies of environmental and conservationist regulations
who challenge these measures as confiscatory and violative of cher-
ished private property "rights."'1 4  The lessons gleaned from studying
Euclid and the Progressive ideas that informed the Court's opinion
can increase our understanding of the ways in which courts and legis-
latures can maintain the precarious balance between public good and
private right. In this way, Euclid - with its strong and consistent re-
cord of acceptance over the succeeding seven and one-half decades,,5
during periods of right then left hegemony on the Court - serves as a
new lodestar. The elements of Progressive jurisprudence we distill
from the Court's language provide crucial guidance for judges and
commentators who are struggling to break out of the regulatory tak-
ings morass yet maintain proper respect for the rights of property
owners.
The approach outlined in this Commentary holds several advan-
tages over the failed doctrine of regulatory takings. Not only is the
manageable and intelligible set of Euclidean inquiries more logical,
14 The "property rights movement" has been active in promoting takings legislation and in
supporting court challenges to allegedly confiscatory land-use and environmental regulations:
The Pacific Legal Foundation (PLF) and a dozen other "public interest" legal founda-
tions located around the country represent developers free-of-charge in takings cases.
PLF and others recruit and train an army of private practitioners to assist them in shep-
herding cases through the legal system. Large and powerful lobbies such as the Na-
tional Association of Home Builders similarly devote significant resources both to litigat-
ing takings cases and promoting "procedural reform legislation" in Congress that would
grease the wheels of takings litigation.
Douglas T. Kendall & Charles P. Lord, The Takings Project: A Critical Analysis and Assessment of
the Progress So Far, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 509, 51I (1998). The movement has been in-
spired by the expansive regulatory takings notions of Richard Epstein. See id. at 526 ("Epstein's
call has also inspired the constitutional litigation strategy of the current property rights move-
ment, which increasingly has turned its attention to the federal judiciary as the means by which it
will accomplish its agenda."). The blueprint for that litigation strategy can be found in EPSTEIN,
supra note 13. Professor Epstein's campaign to push the regulatory takings envelope suffered a
setback in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, No. oo-
1167, slip op. (U.S. Apr. 23, 2002). See id. at 29 & n.28 (dismissing arguments, presented in the
Institute for Justice amicus brief written by Professor Epstein, that advocated compensation for
moratoria lasting longer than one year and that urged the Court to overrule Penn Central).
For discussions of attempts to enact state and federal takings legislation, see Mark W.
Cordes, Leapfrogging the Constitution: The Rise of State Takings Legislation, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q.
187 (997); Julian Conrad Juergensmeyer, Florida's Private Property Rights Protection Act: Does
It Inordinately Burden the Public Interest?, 48 FLA. L. REV. 695 (1996); and Carol M. Rose, A
Dozen Propositions on Private Property, Public Rights, and the New Takings Legislation, 53
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 265 (1996).
15 There are recent instances of judges favorably invoking Euclid. See, e.g., Jim Sowell
Constr. Co. v. City of Coppell, No. 3: 96-CV-o666-D, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9869, at *17 (N.D.
Tex. July 12, 2000) (placing the burden of proof on the landowner plaintiffs and applying Euclid's
deferential test in rejecting their challenge to a local zoning decision); Santa Monica Beach, Ltd. v.
Superior Court, 968 P.2d 993, 1009-12 (Cal. 1999) (Kennard, J., concurring) (concurring for three
justices in a rejection of the plaintiff's challenge to a rent control law, on grounds including
Euclid's "arbitrary and unreasonable" standard).
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straightforward, and internally consistent than the ever-expanding list
of questions posed by the current Justices, it is also more easily and
more fruitfully applied. More than seven decades of judicial applica-
tion of Euclid and its principles have yielded a moderate body of law
that stands in sharp contrast to the threat of potentially boundless ac-
tivism typified by malleable and subjective concepts such as "concep-
tual severance," "rough proportionality," "important sticks in the bun-
dle," and "investment-backed expectations." Yet perhaps the most
significant advantage the Progressive jurisprudence of Euclid and its
progeny holds is its connection to history - not merely to the text and
original intent of the Fifth Amendment, but also to the common law
whose antecedents helped shape the development of early judicial re-
view and whose methods and meaning continue to inform the sub-
stance and scope of constitutional lawmaking.
Beginning with its holding in Penn Central Transportation Co. v.
New York City16 in 1978, the Supreme Court has allowed, then en-
couraged, many owners to base their challenges to regulations affecting
land and other forms of private property on the following words in-
cluded in the Fifth Amendment: "nor shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation." 1 A literal reading of this
Takings Clause does not reveal authority either for invalidating a regu-
lation or for providing compensation in the absence of an affirmative
exercise of the government's (or its agent's) power of eminent domain
to "take" or "condemn" property.'8 Nor does the history of the framing
and adoption of the Fifth Amendment reveal such authority.19 In-
stead, the notion of regulatory taking derives most directly from dic-
tum found in the somewhat quaint opinion of Associate Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr., in 1922'S Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon:20
"The general rule at least is, that while property may be regulated to a
16 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
17 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
18 The Court has scrutinized and approved unambiguous condemnation. See, e.g., Haw.
Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 231-32 (1984) (upholding a Hawaii act that allowed taking
of title in real property from lessors and transferring it to lessees in order to reduce the concentra-
tion of land ownership); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33-35 (1954) (holding that under the pub-
lic use requirement of the Fifth Amendment, condemned property can be resold or leased to pri-
vate interests so long as the development plan accomplishes a public purpose).
19 "The original understanding of the Takings Clause," Professor Treanor demonstrates con-
vincingly, "required compensation when the federal government physically took private property,
but not when government regulations limited the ways in which property could he used." Wil-
liam Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Proc-
ess, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 782 (1995). Moreover, regulations restricting the use of land were
far from unusual during the colonial and early national periods. See generally John F. Hart, Co-
lonial Land Use Law and Its Significance for Modern Takings Doctrine, 1O9 HARV. L. REV. 1252
(i996); John F. Hart, Land Use Law in the Early Republic and the Original Meaning of the Tak-
ings Clause, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 1099 (2000).
20 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
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certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a tak-
ing. 21
We say "quaint" for two reasons. First, this opinion, which opened
the door to judicial second-guessing of legislative schemes, was penned
by the Justice who had dissented so eloquently from his conservative
colleagues' overreaching in Lochner v. New York, 2 the case that, to
this day, is most closely associated with the dark side of judicial re-
view.2 3 There, Holmes wrote:
This case is decided upon an economic theory which a large part of the
country does not entertain. If it were a question whether I agreed with
that theory, I should desire to study it further and long before making up
my mind. But I do not conceive that to be my duty .... [A] constitution
is not intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether of
paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to the State or of laissez
faire. It is made for people of fundamentally differing views, and the ac-
cident of our finding certain opinions natural and familiar or novel and
even shocking ought not to conclude our judgment upon the question
whether statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitution of the
United States. 24
The author of this defense of judicial deference should not have
been surprised that his Progressive colleague, Louis D. Brandeis, not
only dissented from Holmes's apparent about-face in Pennsylvania
Coal 5 but also voiced ex parte concern with the latter opinion, telling
Felix Frankfurter that "[h]eightened respect for property has been part
of Holmes' growing old."26
The second reason why the adjective "quaint" fits is that the major-
ity opinion in Pennsylvania Coal apparently had little impact on how
the Court analyzed the legitimacy of regulations affecting the use and
development of land in the years immediately following the issuance of
21 Id. at 415.
22 198 U.S. 45 (I905).
23 In surveying a recent array of historical and legal offerings on this infamous case, one re-
viewer noted:
Although simply the name of the 1905 case in which the United States Supreme Court
ruled unconstitutional a New York statute limiting bakers to a io hour work day and a
60 hour work week, the word Lochner has for some three generations of lawyers, jurists,
and historians taken on an additional resonance, summing up in two syllables every-
thing wrong with a constitutional jurisprudence that could do no right.
Gary D. Rowe, Lochner Revisionism Revisited, 24 LAw & SOC. INQUIRY 221, 222 (ig). For a
balanced treatment of the relationship between Lochner and regulatory takings activism, see
Molly S. McUsic, The Ghost of Lochner: Modern Takings Doctrine and Its Impact on Economic
Legislation, 76 B.U. L. REV. 605 (1996).
24 Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75-76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
25 Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. at 416-22 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
26 Melvin I. Urofsky, The Brandeis-Frankfurter Conversations, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 299, 32X
(quoting Frankfurter's written recollections of conversations with Brandeis, The Louis Brandeis
Papers (on file with the Harvard Law School library)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
21652002]
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the opinion. Pennsylvania Coal did not earn even a mention in the
four cases decided between 1926 and 1928 in which landowners
claimed that government officials were passing and enforcing arbitrary
and confiscatory regulations. 27  In contrast, in the 192OS and early
1930S, Justice Holmes's opinion was cited with approval by his con-
servative brethren in several opinions (majority and dissenting) unre-
lated to land use - opinions that we associate today with the apex of
conservative judicial activism. 8
So much has already been written about what Holmes did and did
not intend when he opened a jurisprudential can of worms in Pennsyl-
vania Coal with his "too far" test.2 9 Even so, many more questions are
raised by this oracular assertion: From where did Holmes derive this
"general rule"? How "general" is the rule? How can a "rule" be so in-
determinate? How far is "too far"? By "taking," does Holmes mean a
violation of the Takings Clause that requires compensation (if re-
quested by the property owner), or instead a deprivation that violates
the Due Process Clause? In 1922, ample precedent supported a find-
ing in favor of the Pennsylvania Coal Company without having to in-
voke (even indirectly or metaphorically) the protections of the Takings
Clause.3 0
27 See Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928); Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603 (1927);
Zahn v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 274 U.S. 325 (1927); Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365
(1926).
28 See, e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 552 (1934) (McReynolds, J., dissenting) (dis-
agreeing with the majority's refusal to invalidate price controls for milk under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 478-79 (1934) (Sutherland, J.,
dissenting) (objecting to the majority's holding that Minnesota's Mortgage Moratorium Law did
not violate the Contracts Clause); Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus. Relations, 262
U.S. 522, 544 (1923) (holding that a Kansas act that vested in an Industrial Court the power to
decide disputes arising in certain industries deprived a packing house of property and liberty of
contract without due process of law); Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 554-59 (1923)
(holding that a minimum wage law for women violated freedom of contract).
29 Professor Brauneis's work is the best of several attempts to "unveil the mystery" of
Holmes's intent. Brauneis, supra note 6, at 618. Professor Brauneis observes that, contrary to
popular belief:
Mahon was not the "first regulatory takings case." It was not decided under the Takings
Clause. It was not the first case to hold that the Constitution protected nonphysical
property or property as value. And it was not the first case to hold that a use restriction
might be constitutional if and only if accompanied by just compensation. Its supposed
status as the progenitor of all regulatory takings cases is the result of erroneous geneal-
ogy.
Id. at 701.
Less convincing are those efforts to dismiss Holmes's use of the term "taking" as mere
metaphor. See, e.g., Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 35o N.E.2d 381, 385 (N.Y.
1976) ("The metaphor should not be confused with the reality.").
30 Indeed, Professor Brauneis notes that "Holmes and the 1922 Court understood [Pennsyl-
vania Coal] to be a Due Process and Contract Clause case, not a Takings Clause case." Brauneis,
supra note 6, at 666.
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Four years later, in Euclid, Justice Holmes joined in Justice Suther-
land's majority opinion upholding zoning, despite the challenger's al-
legation that this new form of land-use regulation significantly reduced
the value of its real estate.3 ' Surprisingly (but thankfully), the words
and spirit of Pennsylvania Coal were not echoed in the Court's opin-
ion, even though the lower court relied heavily on Justice Holmes's
opinion.32 It is telling that District Judge Westenhaver grouped Penn-
sylvania Coal with Adkins v. Children's Hospital33 and Charles Wolff
Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations,34 two cases invalidating
reform legislation that cited Pennsylvania Coal and closely identified
with conservative imprudence during the I920S.
3 5
Despite Judge Westenhaver's opinion and considerable then-recent
precedent indicating strong judicial prejudice against regulations that
burdened contract and property rights, the Euclid majority upheld an
ambitious set of land-use controls devised by a "mere" suburb of
Cleveland. 36 Today, a badly divided Court is being presented with a
multifront assault on regulations affecting property. While many of
the battles concern environmental and other controls placed on land
and buildings, 37 the modern campaign to resanctify property rights
also involves challenges to any number of statutory and regulatory
programs that have a negative economic effect on the private sector,
such as coal miner benefits, pension plans, and attorneys' trust
funds. 38 Today's Court has struck down regulatory programs and
31 Euclid, 272 U.S. at 384-85.
32 Ambler Realty Co. v. Vill. of Euclid, 297 F. 307, 311-12 (N.D. Ohio 1924), rev'd, 272 U.S.
365 (1926).
33 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (declaring a minimum wage statute for women employees unconstitu-
tional), cited in Ambler Realty Co., 297 F. at 312.
34 262 U.S. 522, 544 (1923) (concluding in a unanimous decision that "the Industrial Court Act,
in so far as it permits the fixing of wages in plaintiff in error's packing house, is in conflict with
the Fourteenth Amendment and deprives it of its property and liberty of contract without due
process of law'), cited in Ambler Realty Co., 297 F. at 312.
35 For a sustained, though ultimately unconvincing, effort to overcome the "conventional wis-
dom" concerning these and other "Lochner era" cases, see MICHAEL J. PHILLIPS, THE
LOCHNER COURT, MYTH AND REALITY: SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS FROM THE I8gos TO
THE 1930s (2001).
36 Euclid, 272 U.S. at 389.
37 See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, No. oo-1167, slip
op. (U.S. Apr. 23, 2002) (development moratoria in Lake Tahoe basin); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,
I21 S. Ct. 2448 (2001) (wetlands controls); City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey,
Ltd., 526 U.S. 687 (1999) (development permission for oceanfront property); Dolan v. City of Ti-
gard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) (dedication of land for flood plain and creation of a pedestrian/bicycle
path); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (state Beachfront Management Act).
38 See, e.g., E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (x998) (invalidating a program that expanded
health benefits for coal mine employees and their dependents); Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found.,
524 U.S. I56 (I998) (allowing a takings challenge to a Texas program that required attorneys to
place client funds in a separate account whose interest income financed legal services for low-
income persons); Concrete Pipe & Prods., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602
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practices because of a generalized notion that an unconstitutional "tak-
ing" has occurred - even in the absence of formal condemnation pro-
ceedings or the destruction of private property, and even in cases in
which regulators offered a scenario by which the value of the property
would be enhanced. 39 Should this pattern continue, observers may one
day view opinions in cases such as Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council,40 Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,4' Dolan v. City of
Tigard,42 Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 43 and Palazzolo v. Rhode Is-
land44 with the same general opprobrium as we now view Lochner and
Adkins - as opinions written and endorsed by judges who, though
certainly not as callous and regressive as they are sometimes por-
trayed, were responsible for provoking a backlash of judicial re-
straint.45  Rather than having their judicial creations suffer such his-
torical ignominy, the current Justices should shift their focus away
from the bumpy and murky path of regulatory takings and toward the
Progressive jurisprudence embodied in Euclid, a much more suitable
guidepost for judicial consideration of allegedly confiscatory govern-
ment regulations. 46
(1993) (holding that the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 198o did not effect a
taking).
39 In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), the Commission granted
conditional approval for the Nollans to build a newer and larger beach house to replace the 504-
square-foot bungalow on their property. See id. at 827-28. In Dolan, the City Planning Commis-
sion conditionally granted the landowner's permit application to increase the size of her plumbing
supply store from 9,700 to 17,6oo square feet. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 379. There was no evidence
that the "cost" of the conditions (that is, the exactions) in any way approached the increased value
attributable to the newly granted permission to make more intensive use of the property.
40 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
41 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
42 512 U.S. 374 (I994)-
43 524 U.S. 498 (1998).
44 2 1 S. Ct. 2448 (2001).
45 Justice Stevens has already issued a similar warning. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 4o6-07 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting) ("The so-called 'regulatory takings' doctrine that the Holmes dictum kindled
has an obvious kinship with the line of substantive due process cases that Lochner exemplified.
Besides having similar ancestry, both doctrines are potentially open-ended sources of judicial
power to invalidate state economic regulations that Members of this Court view as unwise or un-
fair." (footnote omitted)).
46 Euclid is not even cited in the majority opinions of several post-Penn Central cases in which
the Court refused to dismiss a regulatory taking challenge. See Palazzolo; City of Monterey v. Del
Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687 (1999); Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156
(1gg8); Babbitt v. Youpee, 519 U.S. 234 (1997); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v.
County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987); Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987); Ruckelshaus v.
Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S.
419 (1982); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (979).
Not surprisingly, majority opinions that rejected such challenges cited Euclid. See Tahoe-
Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, No. oo-1167, slip op. at 18 (U.S. Apr.
23, 2002); Concrete Pipe & Prods., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 5o8 U.S. 602, 645
(1993); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 487 n.16 (1987); Hodel v.
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II. Two DIVIDED COURTS
Over the past few years, as part of a larger pattern or project that
can no longer avoid the label "activist," the Rehnquist Court has dem-
onstrated an increasing willingness to determine the fairness and le-
gitimacy of regulations and statutes that negatively affect the value
and use of real and personal property or that interfere with private
property rights. The Court has reconceptualized the Takings Clause,
deploying it as a powerful new tool to neutralize a wide range of envi-
ronmental and land-use regulation and to uphold a personal liberty -
the right to own and use private property - that some Justices feel
has been severely devalued. In much the same way, the current Court
has attempted to rein in government programs that it perceives to be
intrusive, if not dangerous, and to increase the protection afforded
other personal rights. In the process, the Court has challenged dec-
ades-old understandings regarding the Commerce Clause, the Free Ex-
ercise Clause, the Establishment Clause, state sovereignty, privacy,
criminal justice, and equal protection.47
The cacophony of opinions in Palazzolo and Tahoe-Sierra Preserva-
tion Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 48 the Court's most
recent efforts to amplify and apply the regulatory takings approach,
comprises a cry for help by a badly divided Court.49 The Takings
Clause has proved to be an unwieldy and potentially devastating tool
Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 275 n.17 (I98I); Agins v. City of Tiburon,
447 U.S. 255, 261-62 (198o). We believe that the decision to bypass Euclid in the first group of
opinions not only contributes to the muddled state of takings law, but also moves the Court far-
ther away from the core.values of fairness, deference, and "substantial justice" embodied in the
original and current understandings of the Takings Clause.
47 See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 121 S. Ct. 2093, 2103-07 (2001) (finding
that permitting a religious club to use school premises does not violate the Establishment Clause);
Texas v. Cobb, 121 S. Ct. 1335, 1339 (2001) (holding that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is
"offense specific"); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999) (affirming the dismissal of a state de-
fendant for violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act because the state did not waive immunity);
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 0995) (finding the Gun-Free School Zones Act of
199o unconstitutional because it exceeded Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause); Rust
v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 201-03 (i991) (upholding regulations forbidding the use of federal funds
for abortion counseling); Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882, 885-89 (199o) (holding
that a state controlled-substance law did not violate the Free Exercise Clause and rejecting the
compelling governmental interest test for generally applicable laws); City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 5ii (1989) (finding that the city's Minority Business Utilization Plan
violated the Equal Protection Clause).
48 No. oo-i167, slip op. (U.S. Apr. 23, 2002).
49 In Palazzolo, the Justices were divided on the questions of ripeness, the nature and applica-
bility of the "reasonable investment-backed expectations" factor, and the impact that a transfer of
the "burdened" property would have on a takings claim. For a decisional roadmap, the reader
should consult The Supreme Court, 20oo Term-Leading Cases, 11i5 HARV. L. REV. 306, 449-53
(2001). In Tahoe-Sierra, the Justices split sharply over the denominator question, the appropri-
ateness of per se rules, and the distinctions between temporary and permanent prohibitions and
between value and use.
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for balancing private rights and public needs. More than two decades
(and several unsuccessful Supreme Court attempts) ago, one of the au-
thors of this Commentary observed, in language quoted in two Court
opinions, that "[t]he attempt to distinguish 'regulation' from 'taking' is
the most haunting jurisprudential problem in the field of contempo-
rary land-use law ... one that may be the lawyer's equivalent of the
physicist's hunt for the quark."50 In the interim, our colleagues in the
physical sciences have been much more successful in their quest.,' All
that lawyers and judges have to show for their efforts is a body of law
that nearly all observers acknowledge is hopelessly confused, with no
immediate resolution in sight.5 2
In literature, indefiniteness and obscurity may - in skilled, in-
spired hands - yield immeasurable gains to the patient and indulgent
reader. Would Joyce and Faulkner, for example, be embraced and
studied by readers and critics to this day had these authors crafted
narratives that were more chronological, straightforward, and, yes,
obvious? Would the impact and import of Ulysses 3 and The Sound
and the Fury5 4 be as overwhelming had their designers not engaged in
purposeful obscurity?
Our most skillful jurists also, on occasion, are capable of reaching
creative and analytical heights by means of intentional ambiguity.
Much more often, however, ambiguity and inconsistency result not
from a conscious (or subconscious) decision of one judicial "artist," but
from the tough compromises needed to forge a majority in a specific
case before the court. Current takings jurisprudence epitomizes this
process, as judges on federal and state appellate courts struggle to
reach fragile accords regarding the meaning and implication of a text
that is itself the product of significant compromise.
50 CHARLES M. HAAR, LAND-USE PLANNING: A CASEBOOK ON THE USE, MISUSE, AND
RE-USE OF URBAN LAND 766 (3d ed. 1976), quoted in Williamson County Reg'l Planning
Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 199 n.17 (1985) and San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City
of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 649 n.5 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
51 Indeed, in early 1995, the sixth and final quark - known as the "top quark" - was discov-
ered, eighteen years after the discovery of the fifth (known as "bottom" or "beauty"). See Antonio
Regalado, With Quark Discovery, Truth Comes Out on Top - Twice, 267 SCIENCE 1423 (1995).
52 "Those who have theories of judicial takings to offer deplore the 'muddled,' 'ad hoc,' or
'chaotic' state of takings jurisprudence." Mark Sagoff, Muddle or Muddle Through? Takings Ju-
risprudence Meets the Endangered Species Act, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 825, 876 (1997); see also
John A. Humbach, A Unifying Theory for the Just-Compensation Cases: Takings, Regulation and
Public Use, 34 RUTGERS L. REV. 243, 244 (1982) (calling police power takings a "farrago of fum-
blings"); Rose, supra note 13, at 562. There is nothing new about this complaint. See Sax, Police
Power, supra note 13, at 37 ("[Tlhe predominant characteristic of this area of law is a welter of
confusing and apparently incompatible results.").
53 JAMES JOYCE, ULYSSES (1922).
54 WILLIAM FAULKNER, THE SOUND AND THE FURY (1929).
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We should not be surprised that the vehicle that has served to re-
elevate private property rights is not the Due Process Clause, given the
disdain with which Justices who employed that strategy have been
viewed since the late 1930S. Unfortunately, the portion of the Fifth
Amendment upon which property rights advocates are now focusing
their energies - "nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation" - is proving as effective as its predecessor
in invalidating statutes and regulations that further the common good
but negatively affect the use and ownership of the private property of
a few. The substitution of the Takings Clause for the Due Process
Clause has not in any significant way enhanced our appreciation of
when regulation is invalid or confiscatory.55
The use of this strategy has not been easy going for the Rehnquist
Court, as evidenced by the shakily cobbled, five-member majority
opinions that are often followed by bitter, sniping concurrences and
dissents. The five Justices who have most consistently joined together
to move the Court rightward - Chief Justice William Rehnquist and
Justices Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, and
Clarence Thomas, all Republican appointees - are far from unani-
mous in their views concerning the role government should play in
regulating business, private property, and personal behavior.56 Cer-
tainly, a different Court that included a bloc of five or even six Justices
unwaveringly committed to one brand of conservatism would have
produced fewer compromises and pulled fewer punches, not only in
55 The intermingling of the Takings and Due Process Clauses has a long heritage. One year
before Pennsylvania Coal, Justice Holmes suggested the possibility of a "taking without due proc-
ess of law." Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 156 (192 1) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to a rent
control statute). More recently, in Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998), four Justices
found a violation of the Takings Clause and Justice Kennedy argued that "the more appropriate
constitutional analysis arises under general due process principles rather than under the Takings
Clause." Id. at 545 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part). Some com-
mentators urge the Court to move to a substantive due process approach to replace a regulatory
takings theory that they believe is too indulgent of the public sector. See, e.g., Steven J. Eagle,
Substantive Due Process and Regulatory Takings: A Reappraisal, 51 ALA. L. REV. 977, 1045
(2000) ("While the Supreme Court has been reluctant to more fully employ the Due Process Clause
in dealing with property rights issues, it cannot provide for coherent judicial review otherwise.").
Courts' and commentators' difficulty with clarifying and applying the "substantial relation" com-
ponent of current regulatory takings law - a component some identify with the Takings Clause's
core value of "fairness" - does not bode well for a switch between Fifth Amendment clauses.
The Court would provide greater guidance and fairness by adopting the more moderate and less
subjective factors derived from Euclid that are explored in Part III, below.
56 For examples of atypical alliances on the Rehnquist Court, see Rust v. Sullivan, 5oo U.S.
173 (1991) (an abortion case in which Justice Souter joined Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Scalia, White, and Kennedy in the majority, while Justice O'Connor dissented); and Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (a flag-burning case in which Justices Scalia and Kennedy joined
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun in the majority, while Justice Stevens dissented). For
an account of the squabbling on the current Court, see TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH, THE
REHNQUIST COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 4o-46 (2000).
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hot-button areas such as abortion and criminal justice, but also in the
realm of private property regulation. The two Clinton selections -
Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen Breyer - along with two
colleagues nominated by Republican Presidents - Justices John Paul
Stevens and David Souter - often dissent from their colleagues' at-
tempts to readjust constitutional law understandings that date back to
the years of liberal hegemony on the Warren Court.5 7  Because the
foreseeable political future holds no promise of clear sailing for com-
mitted partisans on either the right or left, the importance of the votes
and attitudes of the Court's moderates is dramatically increased.
Luckily, history provides important guidance for today's Supreme
Court. The Court of the 1920S featured a contentious ideological
lineup. By 1922, the Taft Court contained a core of four conservative
Justices - Willis VanDevanter, James McReynolds, George Suther-
land, and Pierce Butler - who soon earned reputations for being de-
cidedly unfriendly to the regulation of business.5 8 On the other end of
the political spectrum sat Louis D. Brandeis, a Progressive lawyer
who, though by no means an enemy of the private sector, consistently
favored statutory reforms of big business in the name of the greater
good. 9 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. also generally indulged the
whims of legislative majorities that passed reforms, very few of which
he personally supported. For his judicial (if not his personal) opinions,
the independent-minded Brahmin remained the hero of many Progres-
sive activists and theorists.60
57 Professor Powe closes his history of the Warren Court by noting, "Some, but hardly all, of
the Warren Court's advances stuck." LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND
AMERICAN POLITICS 497 (2000). While the "anti-discrimination principle of Brown is sacro-
sanct," the Warren Court's liberal views of criminal procedure, separation of church and state,
and federalism have fared less well. Id.; cf. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE WARREN COURT AND
THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE xii (1998) (observing that "[ulitimately, the test of the historical sig-
nificance of the Warren Court is whether it managed to leave a lasting legacy of progressive inter-
pretations of the Constitution").
58 For a brief discussion of the Four Horsemen and their reputations, see supra note 6 and
accompanying text.
59 Brandeis "focus[ed] his attention on the growing conflicts between large corporate interests
on the one side and various groups of economic outsiders, including small business, on the other.
He regarded concentrated power as overbearing and began to criticize 'bigness' in all its forms."
EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE
JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH-
CENTURY AMERICA 116 (2ooo).
60 Professor White painstakingly traces the growth of Holmes's reputation as a celebrated
"progressive" jurist in G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: LAW AND
THE INNER SELF 354-411 (1993). Holmes's personal opinions, however, often conflicted with
those of his liberal devotees:
Holmes thought that socialism was a silly doctrine. He believed that most measures on
behalf of labor were futile .... And he regarded the ideas whose expression he was
celebrated for protecting in his judicial opinions as fatuous and immature. His personal
sympathies were entirely with the capitalists. He not only considered them virtuous en-
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William Howard Taft, himself the victim of Progressive politics in
the Presidential campaign of 1912, had criticized his successor, Wood-
row Wilson, for his "latitudinarian construction of the Constitution,"
which threatened "to weaken the protection it should afford against
socialistic raids upon property rights."'61 Not surprisingly, as Chief
Justice, Taft hoped that the conservative bloc, along with moderate
Justices Joseph McKenna, Edward Sanford, and Harlan Fiske Stone
(who replaced McKenna in 1925), would enable him to shape a unified
Court that would not be plagued by pesky dissents. 62 That hope was
frustrated, however, as Stone, the former Wall Street lawyer, joined
Holmes and Brandeis. As Stone's biographer, Alpheus Thomas Ma-
son, notes, "[t]ogether the Three Musketeers fought an unceasing battle
against formalistic jurisprudence."63
Mason also identifies Euclid as a case in which the Taft Court ma-
jority shifted from right to left.6 4 While Mason's account of Stone's
supposedly decisive role in effecting that shift is almost certainly exag-
gerated, 65 the fact that Sutherland broke from the conservative bloc, in
a case alleging a -serious violation of private property protections,
makes Euclid worthy of special attention. It is our belief that the
emergence of Progressive jurisprudence, at a time when the Court was
sharply divided by ideology and temperament, has special meaning for
the modern Court, especially in the wake of the fiery October 2000
Term.66
gines of social wealth; he had a kind of schoolboy's respect for their energy and will-
power.
MENAND, supra note 9, at 65.
61 William Howard Taft, Mr. Wilson and the Campaign, YALE REv., Oct. 192o, at 19-20,
quoted in ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW 210
(1956).
62 See MASON, supra note 6i, at 251-52; see also Robert Post, The Supreme Court Opinion as
Institutional Practice: Dissent, Legal Scholarship, and Decisionmaking in the Taft Court, 85
MINN. L. REV. 1267, 1310 (2001) (noting that "high rates of unanimity during Taft's tenure" were
"typical of the pre-New Deal Court").
63 MASON, supra note 61, at 254.
64 Id. at 252 (discussing the Euclid shift).
65 See id. ("Under Stone's persistent hammering, however, [Justice] Sutherland began to doubt
the correctness of his conclusion and asked for reargument."). Alfred McCormack, A Law Clerk's
Recollections, 46 COLUM. L. REV. 710, 712 (1946), the source used by Mason, supra note 6i, at
834 n.5, is suspect. See Robert C. Post, Defending the Lifeworld: Substantive Due Process in the
Taft Court Era, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1489, 1542 n.259 (I998) (noting that Sutherland had, in a 1925
memorandum to Chief Justice Taft, expressed support for zoning laws); Garrett Power, Advocates
at Cross-Purposes: The Briefs on Behalf of Zoning in the Supreme Court, 2 J. SuP CT. HIST. 79,
87 n.39 (1997) (noting that, because Justice Sutherland was not present at the first oral argument,
it was "unlikely" he would have written the Court's opinion before reargument).
66 Historians, politicians, and lawyers will debate the import of the October 2000 term for as
long as judicial review and presidential elections remain key elements of the American polity. For
early forays, see ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, SUPREME INJUSTICE: HOW THE HIGH COURT
HIJACKED ELECTION 2000 (2001); RICHARD A. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE
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What was it about the challenged regulatory scheme in Euclid that,
despite its potentially negative impact on property rights and values,
made possible its acceptance by a cross-section of the Taft Court?
What was it about the way the opinion was crafted that allowed the
unusual alliance in the majority? By studying this opinion and the le-
gal and societal issues underlying the dispute, we gain some important
insights into the kinds of government controls on the use and enjoy-
ment of private property that are worthy of respect and deference by
our current Court - a Court as divided as the Taft Court over the le-
gitimacy and wisdom of government tampering with private property
and business activities.
III. FIVE QUESTIONS THE COURT SHOULD STILL ASK
Euclid, imbued as it is with Progressive jurisprudence, still serves
as a useful paradigm of the judicial craft, for today the Court is once
again sharply divided in its efforts to articulate a meaningful distinc-
tion between valid regulations and illegal confiscations. For more than
three-quarters of a century, Euclid's logic and text, and the approach
to judicial decisionmaking the majority opinion represents, have
weathered profound societal, political, and ideological shifts on the
Court and in the American polity. Euclid's strength over the years,
however, should not be taken to mean that our courts have mined all
of its value. Regardless of how well-known Euclid is to certain courts
and scholars, it has much more to offer in the basic principles it ex-
pounds.
The attributes of Progressive jurisprudence to which we can at-
tribute Euclid's "staying power" are represented by the five questions
that appear within and between the lines of Sutherland's opinion for
the Court:
(i) Does the challenged regulation reflect the elasticity and
adaptability of traditional common law methodology?
(2) Was the challenged regulation crafted with important input by
experts from nonlegal fields, thus leaving the property owner
with the heavy burden of demonstrating unreasonableness?
2000 ELECTION, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS (20); THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE,
AND THE SUPREME COURT (Cass R. Sunstein & Richard A. Epstein eds., 2001); Jack M.
Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary Between Law and Politics, 1io YALE L.J. 1407 (2oo1);
Laurence H. Tribe, eroG v. hsuB and Its Disguises: Freeing Bush v. Gore from Its Hall of Mir-
rors, 115 HARV. L. REV. 170 (2oo1); Symposium, Bush v. Gore, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 613 (2001);
Note, Non sub Homine? A Survey and Analysis of the Legal Resolution of Election 2000, 114
HARV. L. REV. 2170 (2001). Undoubtedly the volume of literature on this topic will eventually
approach that directed toward solving the regulatory takings puzzle.
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(3) Does the challenged regulation hold the capacity to reduce and,
at the same time, enhance individual wealth and personal
rights?
(4) Is the Court being asked to affirm judicial and popular accep-
tance in the "laboratory" of the states?
(5) Is the regulatory scheme fundamentally flexible, in that it fur-
thers a wide range of public interests and features exemption
provisions for property owners who would otherwise be asked
to shoulder heavy burdens?
These questions, and some of the aspects of Progressiveness they
reflect, are not expressly articulated by the Court. These inquiries
must be distilled from the text, as read in its historical and ideological
context. In the pages that follow, we reset, rearrange, and reinterpret
discourse that, in the opinion, is at times expansive and at other times
obfuscated by mundane details or distracting rhetoric.
The ensuing discussion of each question will demonstrate that this
set of Euclidean inquiries is much more appropriate, useful, and pru-
dent than the confusing and problematic questions spawned by Penn-
sylvania Coal and its numerous progeny. Progressive jurisprudence
presents to the current Court: (i) a respectful understanding of the
contextual nature of modern regulatory law, which is tied to a notion
of the common law that meaningfully responds and adapts even to
profound societal changes; (2) a model of temperate judicial lawmak-
ing that, when appropriate, translates into deference to the findings of
qualified experts; (3) an accurate perspective of the nature and impact
of regulations affecting private property; (4) a prudential approach that
awaits and, barring serious error, endorses the work product of state
judges; and (5) a consideration of the devices that are included in regu-
latory schemes to provide relief to those property owners suffering spe-
cial hardships.
A. Does the Challenged Regulation Reflect the Elasticity and
Adaptability of Traditional Common Law Methodology?
The line which in this field separates the legitimate from the illegitimate
assumption of power is not capable of precise delimitation. It varies with
circumstances and conditions. A regulatory zoning ordinance, which
would be clearly valid as applied to the great cities, might be clearly inva-
lid as applied to rural communities. In solving doubts, the maxim sic
utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which lies at the foundation of so much
of the common law of nuisances, ordinarily will furnish a fairly helpful
clew. And the law of nuisances, likewise, may be consulted, not for the
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purpose of controlling, but for the helpful aid of its analogies in the proc-
ess of ascertaining the scope of, the power.67
These words appeared during a crucial transition period in Ameri-
can legal and constitutional history, as statutory and administrative
law began to supplant the common law as the primary source of law
governing business and private property relationships. 6 The Progres-
sive reform impulse and the new, activist notion that rights and liber-
ties were incorporated through the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment 6 9 (and thus protected from intrusion by states and
localities) brought a large number of state and local statutory and
regulatory schemes before the Court for the first time.70 From the late
189os through the mid-193os, the Justices heard hundreds of due proc-
ess and related challenges. 71
Progressive jurisprudence evolved in the hands of judges who
brought to the bench a worldview anchored in the strong belief in the
inevitability of the common law. Not surprisingly, the Justices were
eager to draw lessons and insights from the common law in their
search for a mode of evaluating the constitutional legitimacy of the
flood of new laws crafted by elected lawmakers and by administrative
officials, while taking into consideration reliance interests and settled
expectations regarding property.
The members of the Taft Court were specially qualified to oversee
this transition in the law. The backgrounds of these Justices revealed
strong links to the common law, as well as a special agility with new,
superseding sources of legal authority originating in the legislative
chamber. Like their predecessors, these Justices were attorneys edu-
cated and engaged in practice during a period of common law hegem-
ony. Several Justices, including Joseph McKenna, Holmes, William
Day, Willis Van Devanter, Mahlon Pitney, John Clarke, Taft, and Ed-
67 Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387-88 (1926).
68 See, e.g., STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE Ex-
PANSION OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, I877-192o, at 249-50 (1982) (discuss-
ing the early twentieth-century movement for "clarification of the relationship between judicial
authority and administrative authority that would facilitate the exercise of the latter"); cf. Robert
L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1x8q, 1216-29 (1986)
(discussing the new statutory and administrative regime).
69 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that no person be deprived
of "life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § r.
70 With his notion of "refined incorporation," Professor Amar has reset the tone and substance
of the debate in this area. See generally AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CRE-
ATION AND RECONSTRUCTION (1998). For a provocative set of responses, AND a rejoinder by
Amar, see Symposium, Commentaries on Akhil Reed Amar's The Bill of Rights: Creation and Re-
construction, 33 U. RICH. L. REv. 289 (i999).
71 The count of substantive due process cases during this period varies. For an analysis of
various lists, see PHILLIPS, supra note 35, at 32-36.
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ward Sanford, had helped to shape and adapt the common law from
the bench before their elevation to the Supreme Court.
72
Moreover, during this crucial transition period, several future Jus-
tices played key roles in the new administrative state; they brought to
their work on the Court valuable experiences as elected and appointed
officials with first-hand knowledge of the growth of the regulatory
state generally, and of reform legislation and its implementation spe-
cifically. For example, the author of the Court's opinion in Euclid,
George Sutherland, had served in the United States House of Repre-
sentatives and Senate from 1901 to 1917, following four years of ser-
vice in the newly formed Utah State Senate. 73 Though he was identi-
fied with the non-Progressive wing of the Republican Party,
Sutherland at times supported reform legislation in state and federal
legislatures, including the maximum hours legislation for miners that
was upheld in Holden v. Hardy.74 Pitney also served as a state and
federal legislator. Louis Brandeis's biography before his appointment
included, of course, skillful and innovative advocacy on behalf of re-
form efforts such as maximum hours legislation for women. James
McReynolds and Harlan Fiske Stone had each directed the growing
bureaucracy of the Department of Justice before their elevation to the
Court. Day served for a few months as Secretary of State during the
Spanish-American War, while Taft was Secretary of War before his
election as President.75
With feet firmly planted in the common law tradition, yet with im-
portant practical experience in the emerging regulatory state, the
members of the Taft Court did a masterful job of mining Anglo-
American law's usable past in cases such as Euclid. By the mid-
nineteenth century, American judges had already demonstrated their
confidence in the elasticity and adaptability of many centuries-old,
judge-made concepts.76 That is, these judges believed deeply in the
crucial role that judicial interpretation from the past plays in solving
the problems of the present, and in the ability of the common law to
respond to profound technological, economic, and demographic
72 A helpful set of biographical essays can be found in THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: A
BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY (Melvin I. Urofsky ed., 1994). See also Northwestern University,
The Oyez Project, at http://oyez.northwestern.edu (last visited May. 5, 2002).
73 HADLEY ARKES, THE RETURN OF GEORGE SUTHERLAND: RESTORING A JURIS-
PRUDENCE OF NATURAL RIGHTS 48 (1994); JOEL FRANCIS PASCHAL, MR. JUSTICE SU-
THERLAND: A MAN AGAINST THE STATE 36-IOO (I95i).
74 169 U.S. 366 (1898); see also PASCHAL, supra note 73, at 36 (describing Senator Suther-
land's support of the legislation at issue in Holden).
75 For biographical resources on the Justices, see sources cited supra note 72.
76 See, e.g., LEONARD W. LEVY, THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEF
JUSTICE SHAW 24 (1957) (discussing Lemuel Shaw's constant search "for ways to adapt the old
to the new, reconcile conflicting doctrines, and so restate the law as to make it practical and plas-
tic" as Chief Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts from 1830 to 186o).
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changes. Perhaps the soundest evocation of that philosophy is found
in a Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court opinion written by Chief
Justice Lemuel Shaw, who observed that "when a new practice or new
course of business arises, the rights and duties of parties are not with-
out a law to govern them; the general considerations of reason, justice
and policy, which underlie the particular rules of the common law, will
still apply, modified and adapted, by the same considerations, to the
new circumstances." 7 7 There may be new inventions, such as steam-
boats and railroads, Shaw continued, "yet the principles which govern
the rights and duties of carriers of passengers, and also those which
regulate the rights and duties of carriers of goods, and of the owners of
goods carried, have a deep and established foundation in the common
law, subject only to such modifications as new circumstances may ren-
der necessary and mutually beneficial."' Before the dawn of the "age
of statutes,"7 9 common law judges such as Chief Justice Shaw were
unabashedly confident that common law rules could be molded to
govern modern conditions without violating "the general considera-
tions of reason, justice and policy, which underlie" those very rules.
More than fifty years later, in defense of a federal postal savings-
bank bill, a Republican senator articulated Shaw-like optimism con-
cerning the adaptability of federal constitutional law to rapidly chang-
ing societal and legal conditions: "While it is true that the Constitution
continues to speak with its original words and meaning, their scope
and application continually broaden so as to include new conditions,
instrumentalities, and activities."80 That senator was George Suther-
land, who, as a Supreme Court Justice, was not daunted by the spate
of land-use regulation that preceded and foreshadowed the litigation in
Euclid. Sixteen years later, that opinion would echo the Senator's
ideas and actual phrases:
Regulations, the wisdom, necessity and validity of which, as applied to ex-
isting conditions, are so apparent that they are now uniformly sustained, a
century ago, or even half a century ago, probably would have been re-
jected as arbitrary and oppressive .... [W]hile the meaning of constitu-
tional guaranties never varies, the scope of their application must expand
or contract to meet the new and different conditions which are constantly
coming within the field of their operation. In a changing world, it is im-
possible that it should be otherwise. But although a degree of elasticity is
thus imparted, not to the meaning, but to the application of constitutional
principles, statutes and ordinances, which, after giving due weight to the
77 Norway Plains Co. v. Boston & Me. R.R., 67 Mass. (i Gray) 263, 268 (1854).
78 Id.
79 See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982).
80 45 CONG. REc. 2616 (i9io), quoted in PASCHAL, supra note 73, at 65.
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new conditions, are found clearly not to conform to the Constitution, of
course, must fall.
8 1
Sutherland and several other members of the Taft Court brought a
new perspective to the work of the Court, indeed to American juris-
prudence. It was only natural that they should look to the common
law for guidance and support - for "a fairly helpful clew" and "the
helpful aid of its analogies" - as they exercised their role as the ulti-
mate interpreters of the Constitution.
In the specific context faced by the Euclid Court, private and pub-
lic nuisance law at the time did not mandate the separation of uses
that planners deemed incompatible, such as apartment houses and sin-
gle-family, detached dwellings.82 If, therefore, the Justices had relied
on common law precedent "for the purpose of controlling ... the [po-
lice] power," they would have declared zoning invalid.83 Instead, what
Sutherland drew from nuisance law - the "helpful clew" - was its
contextual nature, its rejection of absolutism and abstraction:
[T]he question whether the power exists to forbid the erection of a build-
ing of a particular kind or for a particular use, like the question whether a
particular thing is a nuisance, is to be determined, not by an abstract con-
sideration of the building or of the thing considered apart, but by consid-
ering it in connection with the circumstances and the locality.
84
Five members of the Rehnquist Court crossed over Sutherland's
line in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council:85 they employed the
common law of nuisance not merely to ascertain, but to control the
scope of the police power. That is, the Court used nuisance law not
only for informative purposes, but for determinative purposes as well.
After finding that the passage of the Beachfront Management Act ef-
fected a total taking of Lucas's two parcels, the Court held:
A law or decree with such an effect must ... do no more than duplicate
the result that could have been achieved in the courts - by adjacent
landowners (or other uniquely affected persons) under the State's law of
private nuisance, or by the State under its complementary power to abate
nuisances that affect the public generally, or otherwise.
8 6
In other words, under the regulatory takings approach, today the
Court asks, "Is the landowner conducting or planning to conduct a
nuisance?" If the answer to this question is "no," and the regulation
81 Viii. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926) (first emphasis added).
82 See id. at 390 ("This question involves the validity of what is really the crux of the more
recent zoning legislation, namely, the creation and maintenance of residential districts, from which
business and trade of every sort, including hotels and apartment houses, are excluded.").
83 Id. at 388.
84 Id.
8s 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
86 Id. at 1029.
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deprives the landowner of "all economically viable use,"' the Court
concludes that a violation of the Takings Clause has occurred.
We can understand how using age-old common law doctrines to
measure the validity of legislative and administrative abuse would ap-
peal to several of the Justices on today's Court. First, in the seven
decades that separated Euclid from Lucas, there was a profound
change in the prevailing political milieu. In the 192os, Progressive
judges remained enthusiastic about reform legislation, and even con-
servative jurists such as Sutherland and Taft could see significant pub-
lic benefits in some social and economic regulation. 8 Today, there is
widespread skepticism concerning the ability of government to solve
society's ills. This skepticism, unlike the laissez-faire musings of a
hundred years ago, grows out of decades of dissatisfaction and frustra-
tion with federal and state bureaucracies whose expanse and influence
were unimagined before the New Deal and World War II. Four mem-
bers of the Rehnquist Court were appointed or elevated by Ronald
Reagan - a President who stated in his First Inaugural Address that
"government is not the solution to our problem; government is the
problem,"8' 9 and who later that same day ordered "a strict freeze on the
hiring of Federal civilian employees to be applied across the board in
the executive branch." 90 Likewise, Reagan's Republican and Democ-
ratic successors, responsible for all but one of the other appointments
to the Court, took pride in their successful efforts to shrink the federal
government and reduce regulation.9' Their appointees, like those of
87 For the Justices' first use of the puzzling phrase "economically viable use," see Agins v. City
of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (i98o). In Lucas, Justice Scalia equated this deprivation with the
denial of "all economically beneficial or productive use of land." Lucas, 505 U.S. at ioi5. Appar-
ently, this does not mean the absence of all value, however, for as the Palazzolo Court cautioned,
"a State may not evade the duty to compensate on the premise that the landowner is left with a
token interest." Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 121 S. Ct. 2448, 2464 (2001).
88 For example, Chief Justice Taft joined Justice Sutherland's majority opinions in three cases
upholding zoning. See Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603 (1927); Zahn v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 274 U.S.
325 (1927); Euclid, 272 U.S. 365.
89 Inaugural Address of President Ronald Reagan, PUB. PAPERS 1 (Jan. 20, 1981).
90 Memorandum Directing a Federal Employee Hiring Freeze, PUB. PAPERS 5 (Jan. 2o, 198i).
91 For example, in his i99I State of the Union Address, President Bush stated:
The Federal Government too often treats government programs as if they are of Wash-
ington, by Washington, and for Washington. Once established, Federal programs seem
to become immortal. It's time for a more dynamic program life cycle. Some programs
should increase. Some should decrease. Some should be terminated. And some should
be consolidated and turned over to the States.
George Herbert Walker Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the
Union, I PUB. PAPERS 74, 77 (Jan. 29, 1991).
President Clinton expressed similar sentiments three years later:
Led by the Vice President, we launched a campaign to reinvent Government. We cut
staff, cut perks, even trimmed the fleet of Federal limousines. After years of leaders
whose rhetoric attacked bureaucracy but whose action expanded it, we will actually re-
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Reagan, are struggling with the difficult task of establishing a re-
strained yet responsive version of judicial review.
The second reason today's Justices are more likely than their
predecessors to utilize traditional common law rules in defining the
boundaries of police (and regulatory) power relates to a perception that
these rules - when compared with modern statutes, regulations, and
ordinances - are relatively fixed and are closer to timeless principles
of law than are the more ephemeral products of political vagaries.
Thus, it is not Chief Justice Shaw's notion of a flexible, responsive,
and adaptable common law that the Justices who made up the Lucas
majority find so appealing. No, the tone and content of Shaw's words
too closely resemble the rhetoric of jurists who speak of an "evolution-
ary" Constitution, a notion that textualists such as Scalia find highly
objectionable. 92
The members of the Euclid majority recognized that the world was
moving very fast - socially, technologically, and economically - and
that they could therefore not predict what factual and legal situations
might lead to unfairness and injustice in the future. These legal arbi-
ters were poised on the banks of a torrent of new facts and realities:
profound demographic shifts occasioned by millions of new immi-
grants from southern and eastern Europe; newly configured political
and ideological relationships marked by the growing acceptance of
third parties; scientific inventions that accelerated dramatically the
flow of people, culture, and information; and the repercussions of the
nation's recent mobilization for and involvement in a world war.93
Owing in large part to the inappropriateness of, and their impatience
with, certitude in such a world, the Euclid Court accorded elected of-
ficials a presumption of correctness. For underlying this feeling of un-
certainty was a fundamental recognition that this was a democracy, as
duce it by 252,000 people over the next 5 years. By the time we have finished, the Fed-
eral bureaucracy will be at its lowest point in 30 years.
William Jefferson Clinton, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Un-
ion, 1994 PUB. PAPERS 126, 127 (Jan. 25, 1994).
92 Justice Scalia has certainly not been shy in his criticism of an organic view of the Constitu-
tion:
It does seem to me that a constitution whose meaning changes as our notions of what it
ought to mean change is not worth a whole lot. To keep government up-to-date with
modern notions of what good government ought to be, we do not need a constitution but
only a ballot-box and a legislature.
Antonin Scalia, Assorted Canards of Contemporary Legal Analysis, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 581,
594-95 (1989-9o); see also ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE LAW 138-4o (I997). But cf. Lucas, 505 U.S. at io6g (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("Arresting the development of the common law is not only a departure from our prior decisions;
it is also profoundly unwise. The human condition is one of constant learning and evolution -
both moral and practical.").
93 The best historical treatment of the Progressive Era remains RICHARD HOFSTADTER,
THE AGE OF REFORM: FROM BRYAN TO F.D.R. (955).
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expressed most noticeably by the will of the popularly elected legisla-
ture. The judiciary's place was at the boundaries of public policy de-
bates, not at the center, and its role was to check the occasional abuses
of the other branches.
B. Was the Challenged Regulation Crafted with Important Input by
Experts from Nonlegal Fields, thus Leaving the Property Owner with
the Heavy Burden of Demonstrating Unreasonableness?
The matter of zoning has received much attention at the hands of
commissions and experts, and the results of their investigations have been
set forth in comprehensive reports. These reports, which bear every evi-
dence of painstaking consideration, concur in the view that the segregation
of residential, business, and industrial buildings will make it easier to pro-
vide fire apparatus suitable for the character and intensity of the devel-
opment in each section; that it will increase the safety and security of
home life; greatly tend to prevent street accidents, especially to children,
by reducing the traffic and resulting confusion in residential sections; de-
crease noise and other conditions which produce or intensify nervous dis-
orders; preserve a more favorable environment in which to rear children,
etc....
If these reasons, thus summarized, do not demonstrate the wisdom or
sound policy in all respects of those restrictions which we have indicated
as pertinent to the inquiry, at least, the reasons are sufficiently cogent to
preclude us from saying, as it must be said before the ordinance can be
declared unconstitutional, that such provisions are clearly arbitrary and
unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety,
morals, or general welfare. 94
The Progressive Era witnessed the triumph of American profes-
sionalism, a movement that, beginning in the 187os, had recast the na-
tion's educational and economic landscape. 95 Urban planners - like
lawyers, physicians, architects, university professors, social workers,
and other professionals - focused their attention on establishing a na-
tional organization, developing specialized curricula, producing a code
of ethics, and, of course, practicing their skills for what they believed
was the betterment of society. The professional, according to a leading
historian on the subject, "excavated nature for its principles, its theo-
retical rules, thus transcending mechanical procedures, individual
cases, miscellaneous facts, technical information, and instrumental ap-
plications. ' '96 Notables such as Frederick Jackson Turner (history),
94 Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394-95 (1926).
95 See HOFSTADTER, supra note 93, at 148-64.
96 BURTON J. BLEDSTEIN, THE CULTURE OF PROFESSIONALISM: THE MIDDLE CLASS
AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN AMERICA 88 (1976).
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Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. (law), and Jane Addams (social work), "at-
tempted to define a total coherent system of necessary knowledge
within a precise territory, to control the intrinsic relationships of their
subject by making it a scholarly as well as an applied science, to root
social existence in the inner needs and possibilities of documentable
worldly processes." 97 One aspect of Progressive jurisprudence, as rep-
resented by Euclid, was appropriate, though certainly not total, defer-
ence to the expertise and special knowledge of this new breed of pro-
fessionals.
Zoning was the product of two key professional groups: planners
and lawyers. Combining their efforts, these groups drafted and im-
plemented zoning ordinances in communities throughout the nation. 9
Officials in the Republican administrations of Warren Harding and
Calvin Coolidge played important facilitative roles in the American
zoning story, as Secretary Herbert Hoover's Department of Commerce
developed and circulated the very popular Standard State Zoning
Enabling Act, along with more moderately influential model planning
and subdivision acts. 99
On the national level, the principal conveyor of expert views on
zoning was the reformer Alfred Bettman, a prominent lawyer who
contacted Chief Justice Taft (his fellow Cincinnatian), seeking permis-
sion to submit an amicus brief in Euclid on behalf of the National
Conferences on City Planning and other professional organizations.100
That document not only contained key legal arguments concerning the
relationship between zoning and nuisance law and the positive recep-
tion zoning had received in other states, but also, in "Brandeis Brief"
fashion, conveyed extralegal arguments from planners regarding the
various ways in which comprehensive zoning contributed to the gen-
eral welfare. 0 1
The Court by no means yielded its review function to nonlawyers
without qualification. Instead, the Justices staked out a workable
middle ground between total deference to professional findings and de
novo review. For example, although the Euclid Court did not seek a
demonstration of "wisdom or sound policy in all respects," Justice
97 Id.
98 For details on attorney James Metzenbaum's crucial involvement in drafting, implementing,
and defending the Village of Euclid's zoning scheme, see Wolf, supra note 4, at 90-97.
99 See Richard H. Chused, Euclid's Historical Imagery, 51 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 597, 598-99
(2001) (discussing Hoover's activities).
100 For Bettman's role in Euclid and in advocacy for zoning and planning, see Randle, supra
note 4, at 47-49.
101 Motion for Leave To File Brief, Amici Curiae and Brief on Behalf of the National Confer-
ences on City Planning, the National Housing Association and the Massachusetts Federation of
Town Planning Boards at 32-46, Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (No.
31).
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Sutherland noted that the reports of commissions and experts in sup-
port of zoning were "comprehensive," "bear[ing] every evidence of
painstaking consideration."'12 Ambler Realty failed to carry the heavy
burden of proving that village officials, who acted on the advice of
these careful experts, were conducting themselves in a "clearly arbi-
trary and unreasonable" manner.103
We must keep in mind the dramatic economic and political ramifi-
cations of Euclid, the first Court decision that approved the significant
height, area, and use restrictions comprising a comprehensive zoning
ordinance. As the real estate values recorded in the Euclid opinion in-
dicate, zoning inevitably involved serious negative fiscal impacts on
certain landowners, frustrating potentially lucrative development and
devouring speculative investments. Any notion that American consti-
tutional law, even as interpreted by a Court closely identified with an
expansive interpretation of the reach of the Due Process Clause, would
protect the realization of the highest return on a real property invest-
ment died with the Court's announcement of the decision favoring the
Village of Euclid. It is undeniable that part of the rationale for the re-
jection of this position lay in the research and opinions of planners and
other social scientists.
In contrast with the attitude of the Taft Court, majority opinions in
recent regulatory takings cases have revealed a deep skepticism re-
garding the motives and abilities of planning and environmental ex-
perts. We are in the midst of a strident rhetorical battle over the na-
ture and extent of harms that human and nonhuman life face on the
this planet, particularly in highly industrialized and developing re-
gions. Experts advising the government and nongovernmental organi-
zations warn of global warming; decry the loss of naturally "produc-
tive" wetlands, dunes, beach vegetation, and endangered species of
plants and animals; and seek to reduce microscopic particles in the air
and water. Quite often, politicians and right wing activists attack
these experts as "radicals" who rely on "junk science" and employ
scare tactics to achieve their extremist goals, with no concern about
private property values or rights or, for that matter, the Constitu-
tion. 0 4
Perhaps the best examples of an anti-environmental bias can be
found in Nollan and Dolan. In the former case, Justice Scalia sug-
102 Euclid, 272 U.S. at 394-95 (1926) (emphasis added).
103 Id. at 395.
104 See, e.g., EARTH REPORT 2ooo: REVISITING THE TRUE STATE OF THE PLANET
(Ronald Bailey ed., 2000) (challenging environmentalists' findings, assumptions, and policies re-
garding such topics as global warming, alternative energy sources, and biological diversity);
PETER HUBER, HARD GREEN: SAVING THE ENVIRONMENT FROM THE ENVI-
RONMENTALISTS: A CONSERVATIVE MANIFESTO (1999).
2184 [VOL. 115:2158
gested that coastal regulators, who attempted to exact a public-beach
access easement in exchange for permission to build a larger (and more
valuable) structure that was otherwise not allowed under the prevail-
ing land-use scheme, might have been engaging in "extortion.' 10 5 In
Dolan, Chief Justice Rehnquist second-guessed the wisdom and effi-
cacy of a decision by town officials to condition the grant of permis-
sion for a landowner to expand an existing structure upon the grant of
two easements to the public - one for a bicycle path, the other for
floodplain protection. 10 6 In the Ig2os, even at the height of conserva-
tive judicial activism in the name of economic liberty and property
rights, the Court relied on the expert advice of nonlegal professionals
and gave government regulators the benefit of the doubt.10 7 Today, in
asking a different question - "Does the challenged regulation substan-
tially advance legitimate governmental interests?" - several Justices
do not hesitate to reject expert-based findings.
The Rehnquist Court, in Nollan and Dolan, has lowered the bar in
two significant ways for private property owners challenging govern-
ment regulation of land. First, the majority in Nollan asserted that
governments challenged in regulatory takings cases had traditionally
been afforded less protection than those challenged in the Equal Pro-
tection and Due Process contexts.108 Whereas in the latter situations,
the state need only show a rational or reasonable connection to legiti-
mate governmental interests, the Takings Clause supposedly demands
105 Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).
106 See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 395-96 (1994) ("[T]he city must make some effort
to quantify its findings in support of the dedication for the pedestrian/bicycle pathway beyond the
conclusory statement that it could offset some of the traffic demand generated.").
107 In Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928), the Court, relying on Euclid, found
that the zoning ordinance at issue effected a deprivation of the landowner's property without due
process of law. The state court had enlisted the assistance of a special master, who concluded that
"no practical use can be made of the land in question for residential purposes." Id. at 187 (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted). Justice Sutherland, writing for a unanimous Court, adopted the
master's findings, reversing the state high court ruling. Id. at 188-89. While expert-based plan-
ning generally receives judicial approval, Nectow and many state and lower federal cases follow-
ing Euclid's guidance have protected landowners from arbitrary and confiscatory land-use regula-
tions, thus demonstrating that to employ the approach of Progressive jurisprudence is not
necessarily to rubber stamp legislation.
108 Justice Scalia tried to assure his dissenting colleagues that "our verbal formulations in the
takings field have generally been quite different." Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834 n.3. He continued, "We
have required that the regulation 'substantially advance' the 'legitimate state interest' sought to
be achieved .... Id. (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (198o)). Justice Bren-
nan sharply disagreed: "[T]he Court imposes a standard of precision for the exercise of a State's
police power that has been discredited for the better part of this century." Id. at 842 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). "It is also by now commonplace that this Court's review of the rationality of a State's
exercise of its police power demands only that the State 'could rationally have decided' that the
measure adopted might achieve the State's objective." Id. at 843 (quoting Minnesota v. Clover
Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 466 (ig8i)).
EUCLID LIVES 21852002]
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
a demonstration of a substantial relation to those interests.10 9 Al-
though the phrase "substantial relation" appeared in Euclid,1 10 the
meaning of those two words had changed considerably in the interim
between Euclid and Nollan. The Taft Court used "substantial" and
"rational" interchangeably when referring to the relationship between
ends (public interests) and means (regulatory tools). For example, in
the Euclid opinion itself, while Justice Sutherland employed the phrase
"substantial relation" in one section, he also referred approvingly to
state court decisions holding "that the exclusion of buildings devoted to
business, trade, etc., from residential districts, bears a rational relation
to the health and safety of the community.""' In the 192os, decades
before the Warren Court adopted the levels-of-scrutiny approach still
in use today, a "substantial" relation suggested reasonableness - noth-
ing more and nothing less. 1 12 Beginning in the i97os, however, use of
the word "substantial" in Supreme Court constitutional scrutiny par-
lance suggested a step up from the most minimal form of review.113
The second way in which property owners today are advantaged
over their 1920S counterparts is that, in certain cases alleging regula-
tory takings, owner-plaintiffs no longer carry the Euclidean burden of
going forward with proof of a constitutional violation. 114 In the
proper context, the Justices in Dolan held, the government must dem-
onstrate "rough proportionality" between the impact of the challenger's
proposed development and any conditions (typically dedications of real
property interests) placed on the grant of permission: "No precise
109 See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834 (quoting Agins, 447 U.S. at 260) ("We have long recognized that
land-use regulation does not effect a taking if it substantially advance[s] legitimate state interests
and does not den[y] an owner economically viable use of his land.") (internal quotation marks
omitted).
110 See Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty, Co. 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).
I1 Id. at 391 (emphasis added).
112 In the interim between Euclid and Nollan, it was not unusual for state courts deciding zon-
ing disputes to use the words "reasonable," "rational," and "substantial" interchangeably. See, e.g.,
First Nat'l Bank of Lake Forest v. County of Lake, 13o N.E.2d 267, 277 (Ill. 1955) ("These con-
siderations ... all point to a reasonable and substantial relationship between the present residen-
tial classification and the legitimate objects of the exercise of the police power ... ."); Plaza Rec-
reational Ctr. v. Sioux City, iii N.W.2d 758, 765 (Iowa i96I) ("substantial or rational relation
between the prohibition and basic interests of the community"); Bonan Realty Corp. v. Young,
182 N.Y.S.2d 132, 134 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1958) ("bears a substantial and rational relation to the gen-
eral welfare and safety").
113 In Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), the Court recognized that "[tlo withstand constitu-
tional challenge, previous cases establish[ed] that classifications by gender must serve important
governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives."
Id. at 197. For a more recent Court opinion discussing "substantial" in relation to a government
interest, see United States v. Virginia, 5 i8 U.S. 515 (1996), which held that gender discrimination
in a state military school violated the Equal Protection Clause.
114 Cf. Daniel R. Mandelker & A. Dan Tarlock, Shifting the Presumption of Constitutionality in
Land-Use Law, 24 URB. LAW. 1 (1992) (advocating the transfer of the burden to the government
in some instances).
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mathematical calculation is required, but the city must make some sort
of individualized determination that the required dedication is related
both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed develop-
ment.""'  Thus, the next non-Euclidean, regulatory takings inquiry
asks, "Has the government seeking exactions proved that it has made
the necessary individualized determination?" By requiring more
closely fitting ends-means relationships and by placing extra burdens
on elected government officials to prove that their determinations are
more than reasonable in individual cases, the five majority members of
the Rehnquist Court are once again behaving in a decidedly non-
Progressive fashion.
C. Does the Challenged Regulation Hold the Capacity To Reduce and,
at the Same Time, Enhance Individual Wealth and Personal Rights?
The lands lying between the two railroads for the entire length of the
village area and extending some distance on either side to the north and
south, having an average width of about i,6oo feet, are left open, with
slight exceptions, for industrial and all other uses. This includes the larger
part of appellee's tract. Approximately one-sixth of the area of the entire
village is included in U-5 and U-6 use districts....
... The bill alleges that the tract of land in question is vacant and has
been held for years for the purpose of selling and developing it for indus-
trial uses, for which it is especially adapted, being immediately in the path
of progressive industrial development; that for such uses it has a market
value of about $io,ooo per acre, but if the use be limited to residential
purposes the market value is not in excess of $2,500 per acre; that the first
200 feet of the parcel back from Euclid Avenue, if unrestricted in respect
of use, has a value of $15o per front foot, but if limited to residential uses,
and ordinary mercantile business be excluded therefrom, its value is not in
excess of $50 per front foot. 1 16
The second paragraph quoted above illustrates the confiscatory po-
tential of zoning and other land-use controls, which was the primary
concern of Ambler Realty and remains the chief focus of property
rights advocates seventy-five years later. Had the Court considered
the fiscal impact of zoning on only that discrete portion of Ambler's
holdings, we have little doubt that Sutherland and Taft, and perhaps
even Holmes, would have joined the three dissenters and declared this
form of regulation unconstitutional. Indeed, the Court, following the
lead of Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal, might well have dismissed the
11 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994) (emphasis added).
116 Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 383-84 (1926).
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zoning ordinance as another example of well-intentioned regulations
that crossed the line between a proper exercise of police power and an
invalid, uncompensated taking.
It is telling that, despite Euclid's closeness in time (1922) and in
theme (confiscatory regulation) to the successful challenge brought by
the Pennsylvania Coal Company, not once did Sutherland quote or cite
that earlier decision or invoke the notion of a regulatory taking. This
was also true of three other local land-use regulation cases from the
same era: Zahn v. Board of Public Works" 7 (a 1927 decision rejecting
a landowner's challenge to the Los Angeles zoning ordinance), Gorieb
v. Fox"18 (a 1927 decision upholding a building setback ordinance), and
Nectow v. City of Cambridge"9 (a 1928 zoning decision finding a con-
stitutional violation). The Euclid majority's failure to cite Pennsyl-
vania Coal seems not to be an accidental oversight, as Judge Westen-
haver relied on Holmes's decision in the trial court opinions, and
counsel for Ambler, the Village, and amici in their briefs spent consid-
erable time discussing Pennsylvania Coal and its implications.120
The clue concerning why Sutherland chose a different tack from
Pennsylvania Coal, and ultimately reached a markedly different con-
clusion, lies in the first paragraph quoted above. Most of Ambler's
tract was classified for the most intensive, and therefore least restric-
tive, uses. This meant that Ambler or its successors in interest would
be able to operate factories and other potentially lucrative facilities on
some of their properties as of right.'21 Moreover, as the Court noted,
only one-sixth of the land in the entire village received these highly
beneficial zoning classifications. By limiting the supply of industrial
parcels in a suburb of a heavily industrialized city, the village had
shifted valuable development rights to Ambler and other owners of
those parcels. Unlike Pennsylvania Coal, this was not a regulatory
scheme designed to single out one owner or class of owners for nega-
tive, confiscatory treatment. Because of the zoning plan's facial even-
handedness and, as noted previously, its expert-based nature, even
some conservative and moderate Justices on the Taft Court refused to
pigeonhole comprehensive zoning with other arbitrary or confiscatory
regulatory schemes.
117 274 U.S. 325 (1927).
118 274 U.S. 603 (1927).
119 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
120 See Ambler Realty Co. v. Vill. of Euclid, 297 F. 307, 311-12 (N.D. Ohio 1924), rev'd, 272
U.S. 365 (1926); Brief on Behalf of the Appellants at 77-78, 129, Euclid (No. 31); Brief and Ar-
gument for Appellee at 53-54, Euclid (No. 31); Motion for Leave to File Brief, Amici Curiae and
Brief on Behalf of the National Conference on City Planning, the National Housing Association
and the Massachusetts Federation of Town Planning Boards at 11-13, Euclid (No. 31).
121 See, e.g., DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 4.15 (4th ed. 1997).
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Progressive jurisprudence, as illustrated by Euclid, as well as by
Zahn, Gorieb, and Nectow, evaluates regulations affecting private
property from a multidimensional perspective. In contrast, several
members of the current Court, relying on a memorable bit of dictum
from Holmes's Pennsylvania Coal opinion, have reduced their analysis
to one basic question: "Has the regulation gone 'too far' in terms of
reducing productive value, so that the regulation amounts to an un-
compensated taking?" The Justices comprising the majority in Lucas,
for example, eager to consider a fact pattern involving total depriva-
tion, overlooked strong indications that the affected land retained
value even after the regulation went into effect. 122 More importantly,
Justice Scalia's majority opinion in Lucas took a very non-Euclidean
view of "benefit-conferring" regulations, by focusing almost exclusively
on the benefits that accrue only to the general public or to owners of
land adjacent to that directly affected by the regulation. 123 There was
no sense that the affected landowner herself may benefit, even in a fi-
nancial way, from a comprehensive regulatory scheme that, for exam-
ple, requires subdivision developers to set aside a pond or woodlands
or wetlands or sand dunes - unspoiled places that potential home
purchasers in an otherwise overbuilt community would consider a
valuable amenity.
Furthermore, in Lucas, Justice Scalia included an aside suggesting
that, contrary to the holding in Penn Central, "it is unclear whether we
would analyze the situation as one in which the owner has been de-
prived of all economically beneficial use of the burdened portion of the
tract, or as one in which the owner has suffered a mere diminution in
value of the tract as a whole." 124 While Justice Kennedy again raised
122 See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1043-44 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(noting that, even after passage of restrictive legislation, a landowner could still "picnic, swim,
camp in a tent, or live on the property in a movable trailer").
123 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1024-25. Professor Sax offers an alternative to the Lucas majority's
"conventional perspective of private property":
An ecological view of property, the economy of nature, is fundamentally different. Land
is not a passive entity waiting to be transformed by its landowner. Nor is the world
comprised of distinct tracts of land, separate pieces independent of each other. Rather,
an ecological perspective views land as consisting of systems defined by their function,
not by man-made boundaries. Land is already at work, performing important services
in its unaltered state. For example, forests regulate the global climate, marshes sustain
marine fisheries, and prairie grass holds the soil in place. Transformation diminishes the
functioning of this economy and, in fact, is at odds with it.
Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas v. South Caro-
lina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1433, 1442 (1993).
124 Lucas, 505 U.S. at l16-17 n.7. Professor Michelman raised the "denominator" problem
twenty-five years before Lucas:
Is the supposedly critical factor the size of the private loss absolutely, or rather the size
of that loss compared with some other quantity? And if, as seems clear, a comparison of
magnitudes is intended - a comparison in which, were it fractionally expressed, the loss
in value of the affected property would compose the numerator - what value supplies
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this prospect in dictum in Palazzolo,2 s the majority in Tahoe-Sierra
restated its commitment to the Penn Central Court's focus on the
"parcel as a whole."'1 26 Still, Justice Thomas's terse and adamant dis-
sent demonstrated that this debate is far from over. 127  Other regula-
tory takings cases have carried this notion of narrowing the focus to
the regulation's effect on the "burdened portion" to an extreme that
endangers a wide range of regulatory activity. Endowing with legal
consequence a metaphor apparently derived from Wesley Hohfeld and
Justice Benjamin Cardozo, 128 the Court sometimes asks, "Has the
the denominator? Is it the preexisting value of the affected property, or is it the whole
preexisting wealth or income of the complainant?
Michelman, supra note 13, at 1192. This issue is an example of what Professor Radin dubs
"conceptual severance." Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Cur-
rents in the Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667, 1674-78 (1988).
The Federal Circuit has probably been most ambitious in whittling down the denominator.
See, e.g., Palm Beach Isles Assocs. v. United States, 2o8 F 3 d 1374, 138o-81 (Fed. Cir. 2000), aff'd
on reh'g, 231 F.3 d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 20o0); Loveladies Harbor v. United States, 28 3d 1171, 1179-
82 (Fed. Cir. 1994). If the Court were to move away from Pennsylvania Coal's emphasis on a
diminution of value, it could prevent the narrowing of the constitutional inquiry to the smallest
discrete "piece" of property. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency,
228 F.2d 998 (9th Cir. 2000) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of petition for rehearing en banc).
125 In his brief to the Court, Palazzolo for the first time asserted that he had suffered a total
deprivation of value in a discrete part of his parcel (the "wetlands portions"). Palazzolo v. Rhode
Island, 121 S. Ct. 2448, 2465 (2001). Justice Kennedy raised, then avoided deciding, this nagging
issue:
This contention asks us to examine the difficult, persisting question of what is the
proper denominator in the takings fraction. Some of our cases indicate that the extent of
deprivation effected by a regulatory action is measured against the value of the parcel as
a whole; but we have at times expressed discomfort with the logic of this rule, a senti-
ment echoed by some commentators. Whatever the merits of these criticisms, we will
not explore the point here. Petitioner did not press the argument in the state courts, and
the issue was not presented in the petition for certiorari. The case comes to us on the
premise that petitioner's entire parcel [the "upland parcel" and the "wetlands portion"]
serves as the basis for his takings claim, and, so framed, the total deprivation argument
fails.
Id. (citations omitted).
126 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, No. oo-1 167, slip op. at 27
(U.S. Apr. 23, 2002). Justice Stevens wrote for the majority: "Petitioners' 'conceptual severance'
argument is unavailing because it ignores Penn Central's admonition that in regulatory takings
cases we must focus on 'the parcel as a whole.' We have consistently rejected such an approach
to the 'denominator' question." Id. (quoting Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,
438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978)).
"127 See Tahoe-Sierra, No. oo-1167, slip op. at i (Thomas, J., dissenting). Joined by Justice
Scalia, Justice Thomas dubbed the Penn Central formulation a "questionable rule" and observed,
"[t]he majority's decision to embrace the 'parcel as a whole' doctrine as settled is puzzling." Id.
at i & n.*.
128 See Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 582 (1937) (Cardozo, J.) ("The privilege of
use is only one attribute, among many, of the bundle of privileges that make up property or own-
ership.'; Robert J. Goldstein, Green Wood in the Bundle of Sticks: Fitting Environmental Ethics
and Ecology into Real Property Law, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 347, 367 n.122 (1998)
("'[L]egal interest' or 'property' relating to the tangible object that we call land consists of a com-
plex aggregate of rights (or claims), privileges, powers, and immunities." (quoting WESLEY
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property owner been deprived of an essential stick in the bundle of
property rights?" 129  In other words, if the government deprives an
owner of a right deemed essential, even in the absence of a physical
occupation or a reduction in value, the Takings Clause will mandate
just compensation, invalidation of the offending regulation, or both.
There is a marked difference between this elevation of abstract, dis-
embodied rights and the holistic and interdependent approach of
Euclid and its Progressive progeny.
D. Is the Court Being Asked To Affirm Judicial and Popular
Acceptance in the "Laboratory" of the States?
This question involves the validity of what is really the crux of the more
recent zoning legislation, namely, the creation and maintenance of residen-
tial districts, from which business and trade of every sort, including hotels
and apartment houses, are excluded. Upon that question, this Court has
not thus far spoken. The decisions of the state courts are numerous and
conflicting; but those which broadly sustain the power greatly outnumber
those which deny altogether or narrowly limit it; and it is very apparent
that there is a constantly increasing tendency in the direction of the
broader view.130
By the time Euclid reached the Supreme Court, zoning already was
popular among state and local government officials throughout the na-
tion, had received the active support of a federal agency, was endorsed
by planners and social scientists, and was familiar to hundreds of
thousands of urban and suburban residents.13' The Euclid majority in
effect allowed this national experiment to continue, assuring itself that,
because "the validity of the legislative classification for zoning pur-
poses [was] fairly debatable, the legislative judgment must be allowed
to control.' 32
NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL
REASONING AND OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS 96 (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1923)) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)); see also Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the
Transition from Marx to Markets, i i i HARV. L. REV. 62 1, 663 (1998) ("A.M. Honor6 proposed a
list of eleven 'standard incidents' that he claims make up private property, including the rights to
exclusive possession, personal use, and alienation.") (citing A.M. Honor6, Ownership, in OXFoRD
ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 107, 112-28 (A.G. Guest ed., r96i))).
129 See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994) (finding that requiring public ac-
cess to private land "would deprive petitioner of the right to exclude others, 'one of the most es-
sential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property'" (quoting Kai-
ser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (x979))).
130 Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365,390 (926).
131 For the early history of zoning, see CHARLES M. HAAR & MICHAEL ALLAN WOLF,
LAND-USE PLANNING: A CASEBOOK ON THE USE, MISUSE, AND RE-USE OF URBAN LAND
188-9o (4 th ed. 1989); SEYMOUR I. TOLL, ZONED AMERICAN (1969); Developments in the
Lau-Zoning, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1427, 1433-35 (1978).
132 Euclid, 272 U.S. at 388.
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In its review of state court activity, the Euclid opinion cited more
than twenty decisions (from a dozen jurisdictions) concerning the crea-
tion of residential zoning districts; in all but a few of these cases, the
courts permitted this relatively novel land-use tool. 133  The opinion
quoted significant passages from Illinois and Louisiana high court de-
cisions that relate several rationales for upholding these private prop-
erty restrictions: increased urban density and congestion, traffic con-
trol, and fire and crime prevention.13 4  Following these excerpts,
Justice Sutherland included several of these grounds among the "suffi-
ciently cogent" reasons for rejecting Ambler's facial challenge. 135
The Euclid Court's respectful invocation of state decisional law is
an important aspect of Progressive jurisprudence. Although the out-
come of the Civil War and the passage of the Reconstruction Amend-
ments certainly had erased any doubt concerning the hegemony of fed-
eral law, the national government's dominance of the American polity
is a development more accurately associated with the opening decades
of the twentieth century. Federal regulation of commerce, transporta-
tion, banking and finance, and consumer goods mushroomed during
this era, and inevitably the Court's work entailed sorting out the na-
ture and limitations of this brave new legal world.1 36
The relationship between state and federal courts was altered sig-
nificantly as a result of congressional changes in 1914, 1916, and
1925.137 For the first time, Congress authorized Supreme Court review
of state court decisions denying federal claims or defenses. At the urg-
ing of Chief Justice Taft and his colleagues, Congress also created the
modern system of certiorari review, which is characterized by a high
degree of discretion and a severely reduced case load for the Jus-
tices. 138  In fact, Justice Sutherland noted in testimony before the
House Judiciary Committee in December, 1924, that "the Court is bur-
dened by 'a large number of trifling cases,' which he illustrated by
pointing to a day in which the Court heard several cases 'where it was
perfectly apparent upon a mere statement of the case that there was
133 Id. at 390-93 (reviewing state court decisions on the validity of zoning).
134 See id. at 392-93 (quoting City of Aurora v. Burns, 149 N.E. 784 (Ill. 1925), and State ex rel.
Civello v. City of New Orleans, 97 So. 440 (La. 1923)).
135 Id. at 395.
136 See Rabin, supra note 68, at 12 16-29.
137 Professor Hartnett admirably maneuvers through the various legislative and judicial modi-
fications of the Court's review powers. See Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some
Reflections Seventy-Five Years After the Judges' Bill, loo COLUM. L. REv. 1643 (2000).
138 See id. at 166o-62.
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nothing to do but affirm it.'1139 This was not a Court eager to split
hairs with state judges.
What a difference seven decades can make. In his opinion for a
five-Justice majority in 1994's Dolan, Chief Justice Rehnquist ostensi-
bly relied on insights from sibling jurisdictions concerning the most
difficult inquiry facing the Court: "The question for us is whether
these findings are constitutionally sufficient to justify the conditions
imposed by the city on petitioner's building permit. 1 40 One of the au-
thors of this Commentary has compared the Chief Justice's mode of
analysis to that employed by Goldilocks, the famous fairy-tale pro-
tagonist. Rehnquist "rejects the two extremes: those state courts that
take a 'too soft' approach and are satisfied with regulators who pro-
vide merely 'very generalized statements as to the necessary connec-
tion between the required dedication and the proposed development,'
and those 'too hard' jurisdictions that 'require a very exacting corre-
spondence, described as the "specifi[c] and uniquely attributable"
test."141 "Just right" are those jurisdictions "occupying the 'intermedi-
ate position, requiring the municipality to show a "reasonable relation-
ship" between the required dedication and the impact of the proposed
development. "1 42
Chief Justice Rehnquist and his colleagues appeared, as did the ma-
jority in Euclid, to side with the majority of state courts that have
spoken to the issue: "We think the 'reasonable relationship' test
adopted by a majority of the state courts is closer to the federal consti-
tutional norm than either of those previously discussed.' 43 However,
the Dolan majority then took a decidedly non-Progressive turn, refus-
ing to adopt the majority test "as such, partly because the term 'rea-
sonable relationship' seems confusingly similar to the term 'rational
basis' which describes the minimal level of scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 44 In its stead, the
Court substituted its own phrase: "rough proportionality.' 45
Does the Dolan majority believe that today's state courts employ
phrases such as "reasonable relationship" in an uninformed or sloppy
139 Id. at I689 (quoting Jurisdiction of Circuit Courts of Appeals and of the Supreme Court of
the United States: Hearing on H.R. 8zo6 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong.
25 (1924) (testimony of Justice Sutherland)).
140 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 389 (1994).
141 Michael Allan Wolf, Fruits of the "Impenetrable Jungle": Navigating the Boundary Between
Land-Use Planning and Environmental Law, 5o WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 5, i6 (1996)
(alteration in original) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Dolan, 512 U.S. at 389-90 (quoting Pioneer
Trust & Savings Bank v. Mount Prospect, 176 N.E.2d 789, 802 (Ill. 1961))).
142 Id. at i6 (quoting Dolan, 512 U.S. at 390).
143 Dolan, 512 U.S. at 39'.
144 Id.
14 Id.
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manner? For decades, local government officials, often with the en-
couragement and support of state lawmakers and administrators, have
successfully conditioned development approval upon the owner's dedi-
cation of land and money for public amenities that often provide envi-
ronmental and conservation benefits to the community.146  Is it not
more logical to assume that the state judges evaluating the validity of
these programs are fully aware that they are employing "minimal scru-
tiny" language and are thus signaling a highly deferential attitude to-
ward innovative land-use planning and environmental regulation?
As we have seen, state courts used "rational relation" and "sub-
stantial relation" interchangeably in evaluating the earliest comprehen-
sive zoning schemes. 147 In contrast, the Rehnquist Court, first in Nol-
Ian and then in Dolan, has attempted to replace due process and equal
protection analysis of social and economic regulation (both highly def-
erential to government) with more demanding tests under the Takings
Clause. In other words, today the Court asks, "In passing and enforc-
ing regulations affecting private property, have government officials
met the more exacting requirements of the Takings Clause?" Moti-
vated by skepticism regarding the wisdom and fairness of regulations
affecting the use of land, the current Court, in abandoning the "fairly
debatable" standard, has sent a strong signal of its displeasure with the
process of state and local experimentation. This signal is inconsistent
with the Rehnquist Court's strong federalist streak, manifested in
cases involving the Commerce Clause, Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and the Eleventh Amendment. 48 Nevertheless, given
the popularity of state takings statutes and the ability of state judges
to interpret their own state constitutions' eminent domain clauses
broadly, the current Court faces no real need to expand the reach of
the Takings Clause.
E. Is the Regulatory Scheme Fundamentally Flexible, in that It
Furthers a Wide Range of Public Interests and Features Exemption
Provisions for Property Owners Who Would Otherwise Be Asked To
Shoulder Heavy Burdens?
The enforcement of the ordinance is entrusted to the inspector of
buildings, under rules and regulations of the board of zoning appeals.
Meetings of the board are public, and minutes of its proceedings are kept.
It is authorized to adopt rules and regulations to carry into effect provi-
146 See generally Judith Welch Wegner, Moving Toward the Bargaining Table: Contract Zoning,
Development Agreements, and the Theoretical Foundations of Government Land Use Deals, 65
N.C. L. REV. 957 (1987).
147 See supra pp. 2186.
148 See William W. Buzbee & Robert A. Schapiro, Legislative Record Review, 54 STAN. L. REV.
87, 1o-19 (2001).
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sions of the ordinance. Decisions of the inspector of buildings may be ap-
pealed to the board by any person claiming to be adversely affected by
any such decision. The board is given power in specific cases of practical
difficulty or unnecessary hardship to interpret the ordinance in harmony
with its general purpose and intent, so that the public health, safety and
general welfare may be secure and substantial justice done. 149
The zoning scheme approved in Euclid was comprehensive in its
health, safety, and welfare goals; in its geographic reach; and in the
number of uses it authorized. The scheme, however, was not categori-
cal. The experts and public officials who crafted the state enabling act
and the local ordinance anticipated that, despite the best intentions of
regulators, "cases of practical difficulty or unnecessary hardship"
would nonetheless occur. Thus, Euclidean zoning ordinances typi-
cally include safety valves such as variances and special exceptions
that, if employed properly and with pragmatic common sense, prevent
confiscatory and arbitrary treatment.15 0 In Justice Sutherland's terms,
achieving this balance between protecting the general public and pro-
viding relief to burdened private property owners would yield "sub-
stantial justice."
The social-reform flavor of this type of land-use regulation is unde-
niable. Like many other urban reforms during the opening decades of
the twentieth century, planning and zoning were largely local af-
fairs.' 5 ' Efforts to address the problems of crime, corruption, and
poverty in the nation's urban centers bubbled up from the community,
often after local muckrakers published alarming exposds. 1 2 Although
technically the power to zone resides in the state, the overwhelming
pattern was and remains for state legislatures to transfer zoning au-
thority to local governments by means of enabling acts. 153 Local
elected officials then adopt ordinances based on those acts, adjusting
for community needs and aspirations. By taking a decidedly deferen-
tial stand in Euclid, the Court encouraged this bottom-up process.
This deference, though significant, was not unlimited. First, the
Court noted that, while "the village, though physically a suburb of
Cleveland, is politically a separate municipality, with powers of its
own and authority to govern itself as it sees fit within the limits of the
organic law of its creation and the State and Federal Constitutions,"
there were limits to parochial control - "cases where the general pub-
149 Viii, of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 383 (1926).
150 See generally HAAR & WOLF, supra note 131, at 343-62 (discussing variances and special
exceptions).
1s1 For a discussion of Progressive urban reform generally, see HOFSTADTER, supra note 93, at
174-86.
152 The classic example is LINCOLN STEFFENS, THE SHAME OF THE CITIES (1904).
153 See, e.g., MANDELKER, supra note 121, §§ 4.I5-.i6.
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lic interest would so far outweigh the interest of the municipality that
the municipality would not be allowed to stand in the way."'
5 4
The second limit to governmental control of land use and develop-
ment lay in the deep and abiding respect that all members of the Taft
Court held for the American system of private property ownership.
This respect, too, is a significant part of Progressive jurisprudence, for
Progressive politicians were by no means enemies of capitalism and
private sector profit, as Gabriel Kolko revealed in his influential study
regarding the pro-business nature of many Progressive reforms and the
capture of administrative agencies by regulated concerns.15 5  Justice
Sutherland quoted favorably Ambler Realty's formulation of the fed-
eral and state constitutional question before the Court: "Is the ordi-
nance invalid in that it violates the constitutional protection 'to the
right of property in the appellee by attempted regulations under the
guise of the police power, which are unreasonable and confisca-
tory?" 1 5 6 The variance and exception provisions noted above usually
guarantee that the answer to this question in a typical zoning case will
be "no."
Today's Court overlooks the safety valves that are designed to pro-
vide relief outside the courtroom for landowners who would otherwise
allege confiscation. In Lucas, for example, the majority proceeded to
decide the case despite the fact that (as noted in one concurring and
two dissenting opinions) the offending state Beachfront Management
Act had been amended to provide a "special permit" that probably
would have provided relief to the landowner. 57 In addition, the Court
has replaced Ambler Realty's straightforward inquiry with perplexing
questions. These questions feature key phrases that require unpack-
ing, and contain nuances that take the Court down peripheral lines of
inquiry: Is the government interfering with reasonable investment-
backed expectations?'5 " Is this a compelled, permanent, physical occu-
154 Euclid, 272 U.S. at 389-90.
155 GABRIEL KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM: A REINTERPRETATION OF
AMERICAN HISTORY, 19oo-1916, at i-io (1963).
156 Euclid, 272 U.S. at 386.
157 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1010-I (1992); id. at 1032 (Kennedy, J., con-
curring in the judgment); id. at 1041 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 1o61 (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing). The current Court's eagerness to resolve regulatory takings questions in the face of serious
questions concerning ripeness, residual value, and the availability of variances and exceptions
stands in stark contrast to the Justices' cautionary approach in the years preceding First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles., 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
158 See, e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 121 S. Ct. 2448, 2457 (2001).
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pation? 159  Is this a categorical taking?160  Has the property owner
been deprived of all economically viable use? 161 Incredibly, the Court,
in City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 162 author-
ized trial courts to submit these kinds of impermeable questions -
questions that have been debated and attacked for decades by legal
academics and practitioners - to jurors. 163
IV. PROGRESSIVE MEANINGS
The adjective "Progressive" fits Euclid and the village's regulatory
scheme for several reasons. First, judges who practice the sort of Pro-
gressive jurisprudence typified by the Court's opinion in Euclid en-
dorse the view that legislative and administrative efforts often result in
social and economic progress for the commonweal. This belief in the
positive potential of government contrasts starkly with the less defer-
ential posture taken by the most conservative Justices from the late
nineteenth century to this day. These judges often invoke laissez-faire
or free market notions to bolster a brand of judicial activism grounded
in serious skepticism regarding the abilities and motives of public offi-
cials who regulate economic activities and the use of private property.
Second, government initiatives such as zoning are easily identified
with the Progressive era in American history. As the twentieth century
opened, Progressive lawmakers - Republicans, Democrats, and mem-
bers of third parties alike - offered a wide panoply of programs de-
signed to reform the nation's political processes, to improve working
conditions for American laborers and living conditions for urban deni-
zens, to check the unbridled expansion of monopolies and trusts, and
to outlaw unfair trade practices and excessive rates. Although there
were certainly divisions within the various groups whose members
identified themselves as "Progressive, '" 164 one theme that permeated
their reform efforts was a strong belief that the talents of experts
159 See, e.g., Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 5,9, 530-31 (1992) (finding no "compelled
physical occupation"); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982)
(holding that even a minor "permanent physical occupation" effects a taking).
160 See Lucas, 5o5 U.S. at ioi5-i6 (noting two categorical takings: physical invasions and deni-
als of economically beneficial use).
161 See, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (198o).
162 526 U.S. 687 (I999).
163 The Del Monte Dunes jurors were asked to determine the presence (or absence) of economi-
cally viable use and of the substantial advancement of legitimate public interests. Id. at 700-01.
164 For example, some Progressives campaigned for the restriction of "new" immigration from
southern and eastern Europe, while others championed the nation's ability to absorb and assimi-
late these newcomers. Professor Solomon contrasts the exclusionary activities of the Immigration
Restriction League with the resistance of a Brahmin minority who still clung to a belief in the
benefits of absorbing newcomers. See BARBARA MILLER SOLOMON, ANCESTORS AND IMMI-
GRANTS: A CHANGING NEw ENGLAND TRADITION 122-51, 176-94 (1956).
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drawn from the newly professionalized ranks - chiefly economists,
political scientists, social workers, lawyers, and teachers - should be
harnessed by governments at all levels to help individual Americans
reach their full potential. 165
Third, the word "Progressive" comprehends an approach to gov-
ernance and to judicial decisionmaking that is as separate and distinct
from the New Deal politics and jurisprudence that gained prominence
in the late 193os as it is from the formalism that typified the judicial
craft for much of the nineteenth century.166 While it is easy to lump
together Progressives and New Dealers as American liberals (some
might throw in Populists, too, to round out the leftist troika), it is im-
portant to understand the distinctiveness of the Court's approach dur-
ing the opening decades of the twentieth century. During the crucial
transition between a legal system dominated by the common law and
one characterized by the growth of the administrative state, judges at
all levels were challenged to calibrate their analytical tools. The prin-
cipal fount of the American rule of law did not shift abruptly or per-
ceptibly from the courtroom to the legislative chamber.167
Finally, the term "Progressive" relates to the influence certain phi-
losophical approaches brought to bear on much legislative and judicial
lawmaking during the early twentieth century. It is certainly easy to
overemphasize the ties between Progressivism and pragmatism. Still,
it is true that certain representative examples of Progressive jurispru-
dence reflect the pragmatism explored and popularized by William
James, Charles Peirce, and John Dewey much more than the certitude
of the Court's formalist predecessors or the broad-stroked egalitarian-
ism of their successors.1 6 Perhaps the best indication of this connec-
tion to general philosophical thought can be found in cases, such as
165 See, e.g., John F. Duffy, The FCC and the Patent System: Progressive Ideals, Jacksonian
Realism, and the Technology of Regulation, 71 U. COLO. L. REv. 1071, io88 (2000) ("By the Pro-
gressive era, faith in expert commissions was endemic ... ."); Michael Allan Wolf, The Prescience
and Centrality of Euclid v. Ambler, in ZONING AND THE AMERICAN DREAM, supra note 4, at
252, 255.
166 See Grey, supra note ix, at 497-500.
167 Therefore, individual judges confronted several difficult questions concerning the judicial
craft: What common law principles undergirded new statutory schemes and on what bases could
the court conclude that those principles had been preempted? Were state and local lawmakers
entitled to the same deference as their counterparts in Congress? Did an administrative regula-
tion have the same import as a statute or ordinance passed by a legislative body?
168 According to Menand:
The political system their philosophy was designed to support was democracy. And de-
mocracy, as they understood it, isn't just about letting the right people have their say;
it's also about letting the wrong people have their say... Democracy means that every-
one is equally in the game, but it also means that no one can opt out.
MENAND, supra note 9, at 440-41.
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Euclid, in which the Justices endorsed experimentation with legal
linedrawing by state and local officials throughout the nation; refused
to measure the validity of a legislative or regulatory innovation by
holding it up to some eternal, inerrant standard; or viewed the Consti-
tution as an organic body of principles that, not unlike the common
law, could be adapted to changing social, economic, and technological
conditions, while maintaining consistency and respect for precedent.
V. KERNEL AND HUSK
The lesson Holmes took from the [Civil War] can be put in a sentence. It
is that certitude leads to violence.169
The current reinvigoration of the Takings Clause is an awkward,
internally inconsistent effort to elevate private property rights at the
expense of an expansive range of regulations affecting the environment
and the use and ownership of property. The Court's "rediscovery" of
Pennsylvania Coal in the 197os, after decades of relative and well-
deserved oblivion, was an unfortunate (but not irreversible) move. By
asking the wrong and sometimes unanswerable questions - inquiries
inspired by Holmes's "too far" dictum 170 - the Justices have created a
disorderly and highly divisive body of law that provides no palpable
benefit to practitioners, judges, academics, students, developers, plan-
ners, or elected officials. The Euclid legacy and the Progressive juris-
prudential questions identified in this Commentary are much more in-
herently consistent, logical, and conducive to temperate and pro-
ductive debate.
The end of the October 2ooo Term brought two items of bad news
to Supreme Court observers who had hopes that the Justices would ex-
tricate themselves from the regulatory takings entanglement. To the
dismay of supporters of environmental laws and other land-use con-
trols, it appeared that a majority of the Rehnquist Court would be
willing to use the Takings Clause to sacrifice many kinds of regula-
tions for a potentially boundless notion of abstract, private property
rights.
First, the Justices, on June 28, 2OO, announced their split decision
in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island. 7' The five-member majority overlooked
serious ripeness problems, 7 ' and dismissed the "notice rule," which
169 Id. at 6i.
170 Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 26o U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
171 121 S. Ct. 2448 (2001).
172 See id. at 2473 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting). Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Souter and
Breyer, agreed with the Rhode Island Supreme Court that the claim was unripe, noting that
"[allthough Palazzolo submitted several applications to develop his property, those applications
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until that point had been a significant barrier to realizing success in
regulatory takings challenges. 7
3
Second, that same day, the Justices made clear that Palazzolo was
by no means the last word on the subject. The Court agreed to hear
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency, 17 4 a case that raised yet another question regarding the eva-
sive nature of regulatory takings: "Whether the Court of Appeals
properly determined that a temporary moratorium on land develop-
ment does not constitute a taking of property requiring compensation
under the Takings Clause of the United States Constitution?",7 5 This
was the wrong kind of question to ask because there was no need to
use the Takings Clause to resolve the problem faced by the landown-
ers. For too long now the Justices have relied on unstable precedent
and an inappropriate constitutional clause when evaluating the legiti-
macy and wisdom of regulations affecting all kinds of property (not
just land and buildings).
The issue facing the Justices in Tahoe-Sierra - the validity of a
temporary planning moratorium - could have comfortably fit into the
Progressive jurisprudential framework. Even a cursory review of the
three Supreme Court opinions written in Tahoe-Sierra reveals not
only how confusing regulatory takings law remains, but also how that
body of law still fails to address the key issues regarding regulations
uniformly sought permission to fill most or all of the wetlands portion of the property. None
aimed to develop the uplands." Id.
173 The majority phrased the rule this way: "A purchaser or a successive title holder like peti-
tioner is deemed to have notice of an earlier-enacted restriction and is barred from claiming that it
effects a taking." Id. at 2462. Compare id. at 2463 ("A blanket rule that purchasers with notice
have no compensation right when a claim becomes ripe is too blunt an instrument to accord with
the duty to compensate for what is taken."), with id. at 2471 n.6 (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) ("In cases such as Nollan - in which landowners have notice of a regula-
tion when they purchase a piece of property but the regulatory event constituting the taking does
not occur until after they take title to the property - I would treat the owners' notice as relevant
to the evaluation of whether the regulation goes 'too far,' but not necessarily dispositive.").
174 216 F.3 d 764 (9th Cir. 2ooo), rev'd. No. oo-1167, slip op. (U.S. Apr. 23, 2002). Judge Alex
Kozinski penned a strident dissent from the en banc refusal to grant a rehearing. Not one to
mince words, Judge Kozinski invited the High Court to intercede:
The panel does not like the Supreme Court's Takings Clause jurisprudence very much,
so it reverses First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles and
adopts Justice Stevens's First English dissent. Because we are not free to rewrite Su-
preme Court precedent, I urged our court to take this case en banc. By voting not to re-
hear, we have neglected our duty and passed the burden of correcting our mistake on to
a higher authority.
Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 228 F.3 d 998, 999 (9th Cir. 2000)
(internal citations omitted) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of petition for rehearing en
banc) (internal citations omitted).
175 12i S. Ct. at 2589-90.
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affecting the use and value of private property. 17 6 The pendulum con-
tinued to swing with the Court's announcement of April 23, 2002. Jus-
tice Stevens, writing for a six-member majority, rejected the petition-
ers' contention that the two challenged moratoria (lasting a total of
thirty-two months) triggered a per se regulatory taking under Lucas.'7 7
The Tahoe-Sierra Court thus frustrated the landowners' "desire for a
categorical rule," 17 8 over the strong objections of the three dissenters
who deemed "tenuous" the majority's distinction between "'temporary'
and 'permanent' prohibitions. ' 179  Rather than plodding through the
morass of regulatory takings, the Court could have more constructively
176 The oral arguments before the Justices in Tahoe-Sierra further illustrated the need for a
more coherent approach and suggested that even comprehensive zoning would be at risk should
the Court follow the regulatory takings doctrine to its "logical" conclusion. See Transcript of
Oral Argument, Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg') Planning Agency, 2002 U.S.
TRANS LEXIS *2 (Jan. 7, 2002) (No. oo-1167). Consider, for example, the following exchange
between the Justices and counsel for the landowners:
QUESTION: . . . Now, what about your basic zoning law? I'm going to, as a city, limit the
use of this property to one house per acre. You can't have unlimited apartments or commercial
property owner. Now, for the enactment of that, is there a taking immediately?
MR. BERGER: No, Your Honor.
QUESTION: Well, you're permanently deprived of the use of it for commercial purposes.
MR. BERGER: Yes, Your Honor, but you are not totally deprived of the use of it.
QUESTION: But can we get back to the basic question that Justice Scalia asked, and Jus-
tice O'Connor asked it as well. I want your answer. Why is it that a delay for purposes of ordi-
nary zoning, which, let's assume, prohibits you from any use of the property, is not a taking?
MR. BERGER: Because you are there in a process working toward the actual development
of the process, of the property, pardon me, in contrast to being in a situation like these people are,
where there is no process for development. There is instead the desire -
QUESTION: Let's assume that the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency thought, in good faith,
that there would be some development allowed, but they needed a year to think about it.... We
know something very valuable is going to be built, but you say it's a taking, and I don't under-
stand the difference between that and the regular zoning procedure.
MR. BERGER: The difference is that in the second situation there is a conscious and total
prohibition on use, and that's the purpose of the regulation, is to prohibit the use. In the former
situation, where you're applying for a permit, the purpose of the regulation is not to prohibit use
but, in fact, to enable use.
Id. at *r3-14.
177 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, No. oo-1167, slip op. at 2,
16 (U.S. Apr. 23, 2002).
178 Id. at 6.
179 Id. at 5 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Justice, joined by Justices Scalia and Tho-
mas, was also concerned with the majority's apparent conflation of "value" and "use," which he
deemed a departure from Lucas. Id. at 8-.
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and pragmatically addressed the five Euclidean inquiries presented in
this Commentary.180
In similar cases that will inevitably arise in the near future, the Jus-
tices, by considering these appropriate inquiries, can more directly and
intelligibly strive to "do substantial justice" without abandoning their
due respect for private property rights and for the work product of the
other governmental branches.
We close by insisting that we are not asking the Justices to choose
between Holmes and Sutherland, or between private right and public
good. Judges, lawyers, and litigants who for the past few decades have
focused their considerable energies and resources on the "too far" test
are drawn to the mere husk of Holmes's opinion, his rhetorical flair.
Inside that husk is a kernel that has much in common with the Pro-
gressive jurisprudence of Euclid.
Holmes's surprise at the criticisms of Brandeis and other allies is
understandable when we remember that the sage "Yankee from
Olympus"1 8 1 reluctantly and begrudgingly granted the Pennsylvania
Coal Company's request for injunctive relief (not "just compensation"
in the form of damages). Of the many qualifications of private prop-
erty rights that suffuse the Court's opinion, the most famous reads:
"Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to
property could not be diminished without paying for every such
change in the general law. As long recognized, some values are en-
joyed under an implied limitation and must yield to the police
power.' 8 2  The immoderate tone of the private property paeans in-
cluded in the majority opinions in Lucas, Nollan, Dolan, and Palazzolo
leave little room for such thoughtful reservations.
It is long past time that the Justices abandon the husk of Pennsyl-
vania Coal and return to the kernel, to the essential ideas that gov-
ernment may on occasion deprive landowners of speculative value
without effecting a taking, that public officials may sometimes find
themselves outside the generous shelter provided by the Constitution,
180 See supra pp. 2174-75.
181 See CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, YANKEE FROM OLYMPUS: JUSTICE HOLMES AND
HIS FAMILY (1944).
182 Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 26o U.S. 393, 413 (1922). Several Justices have invoked Holmes's
caveat in regulatory takings cases, quoting it verbatim. See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra, No. oo-i167, slip
op. at 31; Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 121 S. Ct. 2448, 2462 (2ooi); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512
U.s. 374, 384-85 (1994); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, ioi8 (1992); First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of L.A., 482 U.S. 304, 330 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 473 (1987); Williamson County
Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 198-99 (1985); San Diego Gas & Elec.
Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 650 (I981) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Andrus v. Allard, 444
U.S. 5 ', 65 (1979); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
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and that judges can protect the interests of private property owners
and the commonweal without rewriting the Constitution. The Euclid-
ean path of Progressive jurisprudence remains their and our guide to
these ideas.
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